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Foreword 
The main argument of this research is that the corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
initiatives of Chevron Nigeria Limited (CNL) in Nigeria do not address the environmental 
damages caused by their exploration activities and are not commensurate to the extensive 
environmental pollution and social dislocation caused by their activities. Through a study of the 
environmental and CSR practices of CNL, I explore its environmental impact assessment (EIA) 
process and Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU) initiative and implementation.  
GMoU is a flagship CSR initiative used by CNL to engage its host communities through 
Participatory Partnership Community Development (PPCD) for sustainable development. The 
study also examines the role of the state, in the operations and actions of CNL and the Niger 
Delta (ND) communities, in relation to corruption, inefficiency, and weak implementation of the 
Petroleum Industry’s environmental regulations and laws.  
Prior to the introduction of the GMoU in 2005, CNL’s CSR initiatives concentrated more 
on giving back to host communities what they deem fit without fair evaluation of the land and 
resources as factors of production. Although the current model is commended for its more 
inclusive approach, it still does not entirely appease the communities and the environment, 
thereby failing to address some core complaints of the ND people. To underline how this is 
possible, Lovins et al (2007) alluded that “until recently business could ignore damage to the 
eco-system because it didn’t affect production and didn’t increase costs” (p. 181). This argument 
forms part of my empirical findings at CNL and seems to inculpate other IOCs operating in the 
region. This research incorporates the three themes in my plan of study, the first being CSR. 
CNL’s CSR flagship model, the GMoU, is examined as it relates to the cluster of communities in 
the region. This model is administered through project investment for economic empowerment 
  Egwuonwu 
xi 
 
and sustainable development, while at the same time gaining a social license to operate for the 
firm. The CSR model is also geared towards minimizing or preventing work disruptions from 
angry communities. The second component is environmental pollution. This is analyzed by 
evaluating CNL’s environmental assessments of its crude oil exploration. Under this component 
the aftermath of oil extraction which usually includes the degradation and depletion of oil sites 
that leads to environmental degradation will be discussed. The third is social movements. Social 
movements in the Niger Delta emerged as a result of the cumulative effects of social injustices 
and pollution emanating from oil exploration, including how oil wealth is shared. The region’s 
social movements highlighted the emasculation of the ND peoples’ rights, lack of development, 
widespread poverty and discontent. At the height of the struggles in the last decade, the youths 
engaged in destruction of oil pipelines, environmental activism and more extremely kidnapping 
and militant behaviors. These have become recurrent factors in contemporary Nigeria and 
accounts for the restiveness of the oil-producing region.  
In Nigeria’s Petroleum Industry, the complexity in the disposal of waste products during 
and after production, and the geographical space needed for exploring, producing, refining and 
distributing the product have majorly contributed to volatility of the region. My field experience 
in CNL and relevant literature reviews on the ND provided background to the socio-economic 
and practical implementation of the GMOU.  This research analyzes the current ways the 
program is run, the social relations practice it entails and the critique it faces with regard to 
transparency, effectiveness, deliberative strategy and motive. Findings from my fieldwork show 
that although CNL has a CSR program in place, the environment is usually set on the back 
burner when implementing CSR. It is apparent also that their best CSR actions are still 
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incommensurate to the social, cultural and environmental disruption the company’s exploration 
activities have caused and continue to cause. 
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Abstract 
  The objective of this study is to explore Chevron Nigeria Limited’s (CNL) corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) initiatives in relation to environmental sustainability in the Niger 
Delta (ND), as both in theory, work simultaneously towards the effective development agenda of 
their host communities. Through a study of the environmental and CSR practices of CNL, this 
research explores CNL’s flagship CSR program, the Global Memorandum of Understanding 
(GMoU) and environmental stewardship process. The study finds that CSR alone does not 
effectively address the development of the ND based on the fact that what is invested in the 
region does not compensate for the sometimes irreversible environmental damage caused to flora 
and fauna, especially considering the deteriorating human and social infrastructure evident in the 
region. It is worth mentioning, however, that the onus of the development of this region has 
always been contentious, as CNL (and other IOCs) are quick to point out that it is not their 
responsibility to develop their host communities or operational sites as attested in the Joint 
Venture (JV) agreement with the Nigeria government. 
This study also explores the inability of the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to 
create an enabling environment for CSR to flourish. The study argues that the value of CSR to 
CNL and its host communities is not mutually reinforcing. CNL’s GMoU is critically analyzed 
in this study in relation to its practical implication in the host communities, considering the fact 
that CSR, which was devised in the Global North, respects and considers other countries’ norms 
(Blowfield and Frynas, 2005, p. 512). The inference therefore is that CSR should be country 
specific, tailored to suit the circumstances of the ND people. This study adds to the body of 
literature that addresses the need for integration of CSR models, business and the environment 
for more effective and sustainable development in the Nigerian context. 
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Keywords: Global Memorandum of Understanding, Corporate Social Responsibility, Social and 
Ecological Sustainability,  Environmental Impact Assessment, Resource Curse, Rentier State, 
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Introduction 
History of the Niger Delta 
Geographically, the Niger Delta (ND) is located at the South-South axis of Nigeria. It is 
bordered to the south by the Atlantic Ocean and to the East by Cameroon. The surface area 
covered is about 112,110 square kilometers, which represents about twelve percent of the 
country’s total surface. The total population of the oil producing state is estimated at over twenty 
eight million inhabitants (Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan, 2006). The ND cuts 
across 800 oil producing communities, with an extensive network of more than 900 oil wells, 
and 100 flow stations (Osuji, 2001; Sangay, 2001). This region is made up of over forty minority 
ethnic groups, spanning nine states; Cross River, Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta and some 
parts of Ondo. Prominent minority groups among them are; the Itsekiris, Ijaws, Urhobos, 
Kalabaris, Efiks, Ibibios, Ikwerres and the Ogonis. The Niger Delta Development Master Plan 
shows that the ND people relied on farming and fishing as its primary means of sustenance prior 
to the discovery of crude oil in the late 1950s. This is because the biodiversity of the region is 
very high. 
1
The area contains a broad variety of plants and animal species, including a wide sea 
of exotic and unique flowers and birds. The Niger Delta is said to be the largest wetland in 
Africa and the fourth largest in the world (Nandy and Mitra, 2004; Awosika, 1995; Iyayi, 2004). 
These 36,000 square kilometers (14,000 square miles) of marshland, creeks, tributaries, and 
lagoons drain the Niger River into the Atlantic at the Bight of Biafra (Ibeanu, 2000; Emoyan, 
Akpoborie, & Akporhonor, 2008). The discovery of crude oil however altered this regions social, 
economic, historical, religious and cultural attachment to nature. The region’s extensive 
                                                          
1The Niger Delta people also survived on gin distillation, boat carving and textile weaving as a 
secondary occupation. Also, most of the indigenes engaged in trading, commercial activities and 
transportation  
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mangrove and wetland areas in the ND have been converted for one form of oil facility or the 
other, or degraded by oil. As a result, this region is known as one of the “poorest, least developed 
and least reciprocated for its contributions to national wealth” (Ikelegbe, 2001, p. 437). The ND 
people lack the necessary social infrastructures, employment opportunities, access to basic 
human needs, health care facilities, and good schools. 
 
Figure 1: Map of Nigeria showing the 9 states that make up the Niger Delta. Source: Google map 
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The first viable oil field in Nigeria was drilled at Oloibiri, in present day Bayelsa state in 
1956, through a JV 
2
agreement with the British government, through the operations of Royal 
Dutch/Shell (Cayford, 1996; Obi, 2000; Paki and Ebienfa, 2011).  Others followed at Afam, a 
year later, and at Ebubu and Bomou, both in Ogoni land, (Akpomuvie, 2011; Ojakorotu, 2008; 
Okonta, 2008; Omoweh, 2005). Since the discovery of oil in the ND, IOCs’ have paid lip service 
to both CSR and environmental management issues. Human rights, environmental ethics and 
socially responsible and safe practices have often been sacrificed at the altar of expediency as is 
evident in the deplorable state of development and living conditions of the oil industry’s so-
called ‘host communities’. The Land Use Decree of 19783 spells out that the state has “sole 
ownership of all lands where oil is explored, produced, transported, and stored, it also defines the 
contents of land in the country” (Omoweh, 2005, p. 115). The socio-economic challenges of the 
                                                          
2
 In Nigeria’s Petroleum Industry, the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) is in a 
Joint Venture agreement/partnership with Chevron Nigeria and other international oil 
corporations operating in the Niger Delta. NNPC operates Nigeria’s share in the Joint Venture 
Agreement with CNL and other IOCs. The share value in the JV is a 60/40 agreement of costs, 
profits and losses in any oil exploration contract. NNPC share is 60 percent while, Chevron and 
each of the other IOCs owns 40% (NNPC, 2010). 
NNPC is the state’s oil company that manages the oil exploration activities on behalf of Nigeria. 
NNPC was established on April 1st 1977, and was awarded operational authority to manage the 
country’s crude oil refining, petrochemicals and transportation of the finished product as well as 
its marketing (NNPC, 2010). 
3
 Since the 1960s, various Acts and Edicts have been enacted by the Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources to govern and regulate Nigeria’s Petroleum Industry (PI). According to the 
Environmental Guidelines and Standards of the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN), the 
Petroleum Act of 1967 is the principal regulation Act for pollution control (EGASPIN, 2002). 
The handbook also states that, some other direct regulations enacted to guide and protect the 
environment (water courses, soil and air) are; The Petroleum (Drilling and Production) 
Regulations 1969, Sections 25 and 36; The Mineral Oils (Safety) Regulation, 1963, Part 111 
Section 7 and Part IV Section 44 and 45; The Petroleum Regulations 1967; The Oil in Navigable 
Waters Decree NO. 34/Regulation 1968; The Oil Pipeline Ordinance Cap 145 of 1956, as 
amended by the Oil Pipeline Act 1965, Section 17(3) and; The Petroleum Refining Regulations 
1974, Section 43 (p. 1). These laws supposedly designed to protect the interest of stakeholders as 
well as the environment, however, portray the state’s ownership of the land and not the 
indigenous communities as owners, see Akpomuvie, 2011; Omoweh, 2005 
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ND are as a result of extensive and continuous ecological damage caused by the extractive 
operations of foreign dominated oil companies in the ND (see Jike, 2004; Ite and Idemudia, 
2006; Eweje, 2006; Aaron, 2012). 
 Figure 2: Niger Delta habitat teeming with its biodiversity.       Source: Getty Images Limited. 
The fact is, sixty percent of ND people, according to the Niger Delta Development report 
for UNDP (2006), depend on the natural environment ‘living or non-living’ for its survival 
(Zabbey, 2009). This is why the communities expect so much social and economic provision 
from CNL (and other IOCs). This dependence has increased debate on CSR, questioning whether 
actually CSR can create sustainable development in the region as the communities highly expect 
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it to. Accordingly, Smith, (2003) admits that CSR may be “unavoidable” and it seems to have 
become of  “strategic significance” (p. 34) in the region. Oil wealth in the country has 
metamorphosed into the paradox of plenty, coupled with poor development, marginalization and 
exclusion of the people. Despite the new wave of CSR in the ND we should not ignore the fact 
that IOCs are still violating environmental laws (see Aiyede, 2004; Boele et al 2001; Phillips, 
1999; Okonta, 2000; Edoho, 2008). As an illustration, Zabbey, (2008) explains, that the rich and 
dense ND mangroves are to the local people what ‘taxes are to federal governments’. This he 
continues, is because the “Mangroves provide coastal communities with about 46 ecosystem 
goods (seafood, fuel wood, dye, stakes, and so on) and 9 ecological services to other productive 
ecosystems (such as coral reef)” (p. 5) and all these are facing extinction.  
This chapter establishes the goal of this research, inherent challenges, and outlines the 
methodology used and theoretical frameworks. Chapter 2 considers the limitations of EIA 
standards and environmental sustainability in the Nigerian context with specific focus on CNL.  
This is discussed further in relation to the degree of CNL’s adherence to the spirit and letter of 
Environmental Guidelines and Standards of the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN). 
EGASPIN is a handbook from the Nigeria Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) that lays 
out all the environmental laws that guide the Nigeria PI. The third chapter discusses transparency 
initiatives as relevant to CNL and the Petroleum Industry. It analyzes the Nigeria Extractive 
Industry Initiative (NEITI), the local branch of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 
(EITI), the DPR and the Nigerian government. The fourth chapter analyzes CNL’s flagship CSR 
initiative, the GMoU and its potential and perceived impact in the overall development impact in 
the region. The concluding chapter gives an overview of the study, conclusion, recommendation 
and lastly, provision for further study. Together these chapters dovetail into the broader 
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argument of this narrative to deconstruct the factors that have contributed to the 
underdevelopment of this oil rich region of Nigeria. 
Case study profile 
 
 
Figure 3: Chevron Nigeria limited 13 concessions – Areas of interest        Source: Google Maps. 
  
CNL through its partner at that time, American Overseas Petroleum Limited (later known 
as Texaco Petroleum Company), found oil at the Koluama Field, offshore Nigeria, in 1963. That 
same year, CNL started drilling near the Escravos River and found the Okan Field in Delta state 
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(Chevron: the Nigeria Fact Sheet, 2013). CNL is a 
4
subsidiary of Chevron Africa and Latin 
America Exploration and Production (CALEP). In Nigeria, Chevron operates its business 
through its subsidiary CNL headquartered in Lagos, Nigeria. The company operates and holds a 
40 percent interest in 13 oil concessions including: the Abiteye, Makaraba, Utonana, Opuekeba, 
Benin River, Gbokoda and Dibi fields; Olero creek, and Ekura well, under a JV agreement with 
the NNPC.   
CNL is the third largest IOC in Nigeria (Shell and ExxonMobil are first and second 
respectively). It is one of the country’s largest investors, spending annually over USD$3 billion 
(Chevron, 2013). In 2012, the company’s net daily production in Nigeria averaged 238,000 
barrels of crude oil, 165 million cubic feet of natural gas, and 4,000 barrels of LPG (Chevron, 
2013). According to CNL’s own data, it has assets on land, swamp and near-offshore 
concessions spread across an estimated 2.2 million acres (8,900 square kilometers) in the ND. 
The company also reports a large interest in Deepwater Nigeria (one of Nigeria's largest 
Deepwater discoveries), the Agbami Field, and Usan project (Chevron, 2013). Chevron provides 
career opportunities for Nigerians hired as employees and workers who are under contract 
(Chevron Corporate Responsibility Report, 2012; Chevron: Nigeria Fact Sheet, 2013).  
The international oil market desires Nigeria’s crude oil (Ross 2003, p. 3), and Nigeria's PI 
has success stories of extraction and production of its high value, sweet and light crude oil, such 
                                                          
4
 The shareholders of Chevron and Texaco Oil Corporation both agreed and voted for a merger 
on October 9th, 2001. They had both been rivals and competitors in the Unites States of America 
energy market. Upon the merger, Chevron changed its company name to ChevronTexaco 
corporationCorporation. However, on May 9th, 2005, Chevron changed its name From 
ChevronTexaco to Chevron corp. 
http://www.chevron.com/about/history/1980/ 
http://www.chevron.com/about/history/2002/. 
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as  Antan Blend, Bonny Light, Bonny Medium, Brass Blend, Escravos Light, Forcados Blend, 
IMA, Odudu Blend, Pennington Light, Qua-Iboe Light and Ukpokiti (NNPC, 2014). Nigeria’s 
oil is easily refined and transported due to its lightness (O’Neill, 2007, p. 1). Thus Nigeria oil is 
unlike Athabasca oil in Alberta Canada and Orinoco heavy oil in Venezuela, which are heavy 
and very costly to refine and transport (Dusseault, 2001; Baynard, 2011).This raises legitimate 
questions as to why Nigeria does not have more leverage from crude oil resources, considering 
the global economic importance of the product.  It has neither optimally utilized the revenue 
from oil to elevate the standard of living of its citizens, nor has it invested in non-oil revenue 
sources. According to information gathered from sources listed below, Nigeria’s economic gains 
from its sweet crude oil, derived from a maximum daily production capacity of 2.5 million 
barrels, ranks the country as Africa's largest producer of oil, ranks in the top 15 largest oil 
producing countries in the world and the fourth largest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in 
the world in 2012 (NNPC, 2014; Ogunmupe, 2012; U.S Energy Information Administration, 
2013).  Figure 1 shows the map of Nigeria showing the nine oil producing states that make up 
the Niger Delta. These states are marked out in different color shades below the map. 
As one of the few oil exporting countries in Africa and a member of the Organization of 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) since 1971, it would be predicted that Nigeria would 
have potential for development (O’Neil, 2007; Karl, 1997).  At this time, Nigeria could be 
expected to manifest blazing affluence and abundance of quality social infrastructures, promising 
employment opportunities, better standard of living, and zero incidence (although sounds 
unrealistic) of poverty in the population. Unfortunately, Nigeria ranks amongst the poorest in the 
world (World Bank, 2013). The ‘petro dollar’ or ‘oil wealth’ as is often interchangeably used has 
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not been properly managed. The Niger Delta people have perhaps suffered the most (Yang, 
2010).  
According to the former General Manager of CNL’s Policy, Governance and Public 
Affairs (PGPA) department, Mr. Femi Odumabo:  
Currently oil production capacity is less than 90 million barrels per day, leaving global 
market with very little flexibility in the event of a disruption. The World Bank expects 
the global economy to double between 2005 and 2030, from about $35 trillion to $70 
trillion. . . That economic growth is expected to increase global energy demand by 50 
percent in the same time period. Most will come from the developing world like Nigeria 
as its economies continue to expand (This Day Live, Aug. 2011). 
It is logical therefore to infer that for CNL to be an active provider of this global energy, 
it has to get involved in CSR-community development projects, to guarantee continuity in their 
areas of operation. In this light, we will now discuss CSR and Chevron’s current CSR model. 
Evolution of CSR in the extractive industry 
CSR was invented by the oil industry (notably Shell/Royal Dutch) at the global level in 
part response to the Brent spar incident – the Brent Spar incident was outrage from the public 
over the dumping of Shell’s floating oil platform buoy in the North Sea; and also the Movement 
for the Survival of Ogoni People’s (MOSOP) protests in Nigeria (see Frynas 2003, p. 275; 
Frynas 2005, p. 253), and later to seek to reduce pressures from indigenous self-determination 
groups fighting for stake in the control of their natural resources. The implementation of CSR 
aims to improve the corporate reputation of the firm in order to enhance its global share value 
and to respond to international calls for improved corporate behavior. The unequal distribution of 
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oil revenues in Nigeria, the struggle for resource control and the sustained deprivation of 
economic and human rights by the oil companies with the tacit approval of the ruling elite has 
generated furor among the ND communities. This frustration led to the emergence of economic 
and environmental rights activists groups.  The pioneers, MOSOP, led by the late poet and 
activist Ken Saro-Wiwa published the Ogoni Bill of Rights in 1990 (see Adodo, 2000). Other 
ethnic nationalities like the Itsekiris, Ijaws and Urhobos formed their own movements which set 
conditions for oil companies operating on their lands. Armed youth movements emerged after 
2003, some of them calling for outright control of the natural resources domiciled in their 
ancestral land. By 2004 several of these groups armed themselves into an insurgent movement. 
Prior to the armed movements, most violence in the region was inflicted by the state to deter 
frequent oil exploration disruption by the ND’s angry communities.  
At the height of this youth restiveness in the last decade, groups like Movement for the 
Emancipation of Niger Delta peoples (MEND) and Niger Delta Volunteer Force engaged in oil 
installation vandalization, kidnapping of expatriate workers and other violent practices to drive 
home their demand for stoppage of environmental pollution (Abraham, 2011; Afinotan, and 
Ojakorotu, 2009; Ikelegbe, 2001; Ogundiya, 2009; Okonta, 2008; Watts, 2008). As a result of 
these agitations and destruction of operations, oil companies CSR allowed the firms to appear 
comparatively benign while community youths were portrayed as the villains.   
Thus, conceptions of CSR is geared towards maximizing financial returns for businesses 
- business case (see Smith, 2003; Blowfield, 2005; Frynas, 2005; Idemudia, 2009; Ojo, 2012; 
Porter and Kramer, (2006); Amaeshi et al (2006); and Hohnen and  Potts, (2007) and at the same 
time creating social good for the society - development case,  (Amaeshi, et al 2006; Idemudia, 
2009). Ideally, CSR is what a corporate entity is doing to show that they are part of a society, for 
                        Chapter one  
11 
 
instance, contributing a major part of their profit to help the society. However, because in 
practice CSR appear as a ‘misguided virtue’ with little or no emphasis and or support for 
corporate regulation (Henderson, 2001; Macleod and Lewis, 2004, p. 78), it is paramount then to 
signalize that for CSR to be successfully implemented in developing countries with rich natural 
resources, there must be an integration of the environment to social as well as economic good. 
According to the International Standard for Organization ISO 26000
5
 Working Group on Social 
responsibility, CSR is: 
responsibility of an organization for the impacts of its decisions and activities on society 
and the environment through transparent and ethical behavior that is consistent with 
sustainable development and the welfare of society; takes into account the expectations of 
stakeholders; is in compliance with applicable law and consistent with international 
norms of behavior; and is integrated throughout the organization. (Working definition, 
ISO 26000 Working Group on Social Responsibility, Sydney, February 2007 in Hohnen 
and Potts 2007).   
A greater percentage of companies’ CSR reports according to Smith, (2003), “do not 
seem to be reflective of a deep commitment to CSR or, at least, they suffer from a failure to 
identify the issues that matter most for measurement, management and reporting” (p. 27). A 
company should not focus on one aspect (social or economic) of importance, but has to also 
consider the aspect that would be more beneficial to the recipients as well. Besides complaints 
about disconnection from the environment, most of the oil communities need urgent assistance in 
                                                          
5
 International Standard for Organizations ISO 26000 is a CSR implementation guide for 
businesses. It lays out the principles and expectations for businesses on CSR terms and 
principles. 
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food and other basic necessities, these reasons are known to be behind the two sets of invasion of 
CNL operation sites in Delta state. The first was at the firm’s Escravos Tank Farm by 200 
hundred Itsekiri women which lasted for 10 days; and in another attack, about 1000 Ijaw women 
invaded four of CNL’s operation sites at Gbaramatu community which also lasted 10 days 
(Branigan and Vidal, 2002:8; Okpowo and Adebayo, 2002:1-4). Both protests were due to the 
excruciating social and economic hardship as revealed by the women and CNL’s broken 
promises. Within this context, however, new CSR models were put into place that aimed at 
improving upon the previous models which were seen as fostering divisions between 
neighboring groups. Chevron started to implement its CSR program in form of the GMoU model 
in 2005 (GMoU handbook, n.d). As further background to the current context, we now turn to 
the CNL’s CSR flagship model in Nigeria, the GMoU.  
Chevron Nigeria GMoU. 
In 2005, CNL in partnership with NNPC adopted a new flagship model to community 
engagement and relations in the ND geared towards establishing a Participatory Partnership 
Community Development PPCD) process, to attend to the needs of the local communities 
surrounding CNL’s areas of operations (Chevron GMoU handbook, n.d). Information gathered 
from Nigeria states Chevron as the pioneer of GMoU.  With the rate of success stories 
(according to Chevron) from the GMoU, CNL encouraged other IOCs to adopt the same model 
(Oral interview 2013) also see Aaron, 2012. This is because, the new model grants that, 
“development is in the hands of the locals” (Field work data, August 2013) because it allows and 
encourages participatory partnerships among key stakeholders. The ‘developmental’ approach of 
CNL’s (GMoU) would require innovative partnerships with communities that would 
allow/ensure the ability to create maximum sustainable development benefits the ND 
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communities can have through local content policies, with linkages to domestic economies. CNL 
stresses that it has invested in and completed several community projects worth more than $6.3 
million  to enhance the quality of life in these clusters of communities (Chevron: Nigeria Fact 
Sheet, 2013; Chevron Corporate Responsibility Report, 2012).  
CSR Bill in Nigeria 
The Nigerian CSR Bill is intended to create a CSR commission to manage and monitor 
activities of corporate entities in Nigeria. The Bill was introduced by Senator Uche 
Chukwumerije, a senator in Nigeria’s National Assembly in 2008, and it is still in the National 
Assembly for scrutiny. Objectives of the bill are to ensure that corporations: 
a) Support and provide environmental, social, and economic achievements geared 
towards sustainable development in affected communities, 
b) Encourage participatory engagement of corporations and communities 
c) Improve the regulatory practices, confidence and management system 
d) Deviate from improper engagement in political activities (Amao, 2008; Mordi et 
al 2012). 
The enactment of Nigeria’s CSR Bill, experts argue, should be such that it does not substitute for 
the social responsibility of the FGN to its citizens. Rather, they argue that IOCs’ efforts should 
be complimentary. CSR should complement government’s provision of social services and 
welfare for its people, and not as shift away from government’s responsibility in reducing 
poverty and promoting development to corporations (see Bessley and Evans, 1978; Idemudia, 
2008; Blowfield, 2004, 2005; Jenkins, 2005). This is because “if the state government weakens 
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the ability for businesses to operate productively . . .  the wealth that pays taxes and supports 
non-profit contributions evaporates” (Porter and Kramer, 2006, p. 5). Nigeria’s government is a 
major culprit in the prolonged plight of the ND people. Although CNL (the subject of this study) 
and other IOCs receive the brunt of criticism, much of this criticism should also be directed at 
the FGN which has set a poor example in lending and providing social welfare services and 
development to benefit its citizens. The FGN should make efforts to increase its potential to 
achieve sustainable growth. Such efforts should start from a progression and shift from CSR to 
corporate social integration (Porter and Kramer, 2006) where corporations actually partner with 
the state to create social and economic support for the people. With that it is important to 
acknowledge that no business can solve all of societies’ problems or bear the cost for it (Porter, 
2006, p. 6; Lewis and Macleod, 2004, p. 83). Likewise, it is also important that businesses 
address social issues that may constrain their effective competition in the international oil 
market, by creating economic and social value for the region from which they operate.  (Porter 
and Kramer, argue that there should be a “shift from defensive posture to affirmative approach, 
from emphasis on image to emphasis on substance” (p. 13) for an effective CSR implementation. 
Effect of oil extraction in the Niger Delta 
Environmental degradation is a contentious issue in the ND and has led to conflict 
between the FGN, oil industry’s host communities and IOCs. Some of the problematic issues 
cited as causative factors are oil exploration, production, refining and distribution of crude and 
refined oil, as well as the intentional siphoning of oil from wells to sell on local markets. Oil 
pollution in the ND is mainly caused by negligence in the activities of oil companies such as 
spills from corroded oil pipelines, excessive gas flaring, dumping of crude oil waste, and willful 
vandalization of oil installations by angry youths.  
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The major cause of environmental degradation onshore in this region is the long-standing 
oil exploration and production. Pollution offshore is more difficult to detect and highlight 
because it occurs in non-inhabited areas and may be dispersed tidally so that it cannot be easily 
monitored by fishing residents and boats. Pollution offshore involves contamination of seawater, 
which invariably affects fishery and marine life. This is elaborated upon utilizing the EGASPIN 
regulatory guideline in chapter two. Indigenes of the ND blame CNL, FGN and other IOCs for 
negligence and insensitivity to their plight, while the government and IOCs accuse the indigenes 
of economic sabotage when they do not allow them access to contain oil spill sites until a ransom 
has been paid.  In response to a rise in cases of sabotage against oil installations, the oil industry 
and federal government passed a formal regulation preventing compensation to communities in 
spills where sabotage was deemed to be the case. As a facet of sabotage, the IOCs alongside 
various oil industry analysis, maintain that illegal oil bunkering (that is, oil theft) is a major 
contributor to environmental damage. In its 2012 Corporate Responsibility Report, CNL stated 
that one of its core values is to protect people and the environment. Notwithstanding, its EIA 
process and CSR measures and implementation is not explicit on the issue of brownfields and the 
environment. What this study found was that they talk more about new technologies and safer 
production models (future models) and less on environmental remediation. They tend not to have 
long term or medium term plans on how the ecosystem of brown fields continues long after oil 
exploration is done. 
Natural resource curse paradigm 
The ‘resource curse is understood as “negative growth and development outcomes 
associated with minerals and petroleum-led development” (Karl, 2007, p. 661). Since the 
Industrial Revolution, consistent growth in international trade brought with it numerous 
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challenges.  Human dependency on natural resources has skyrocketed, leading to scramble for 
dwindling supplies or the pursuit of more supplies. The resource curse is a problem viewed as 
typifying countries which export high-valued natural resources (Auty 2002, p. 1; Karl 2007, p. 
662).  The Niger Delta and Nigerian paradox clearly reflect this. Since the discovery of crude oil 
in commercial quantities, Nigerian government has largely neglected other revenue earners like 
cocoa, groundnuts and gum Arabic production. Other solid mineral resources like Zinc, Lead and 
Precious stones have been largely ignored due to the large income received in the form of petro-
dollars. The concept of the resource curse is used to explain a complex web of events and 
relationships that start with the euphoria of this new found resource wealth, leading to an 
unfounded sense of invincibility, ultimately fueling corruption and over-reliance on the resource 
to the exclusion of exploring other revenue generation options. This is largely sustained by the 
greed of the ruling elite through subtle and sometimes not so subtle manipulation of state 
institutions. The effect is a reshuffling of societal values and priorities towards productivity. For 
example, Auty (2004), explains that because the economies of natural resource rich countries is 
sustained by revenue from one export product, diversifying to more competitive manufacturing 
sectors  is delayed or neglected. On the other hand, developed countries with poor natural 
resource, are able to plan, nurture and sustain thriving economic growth based on resource 
imports (p. 34).   
Rentier State: Nigeria’s dependence on oil rents. What effect? 
The ‘Rentier State’ is related to the concept of the resource curse. The dynamics of the 
appropriation of oil revenues over time have shaped Nigeria as a ‘rentier’ state, institutionally 
dependent on funds from oil revenues rather than taxes generated across industries and 
populations. Nigeria’s economy largely depends on ‘rents, royalties, and taxes from its PI since 
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the discovery of crude oil in commercial quantity in 1958 (Ross, 2001; Alabi and Ntukekpo, 
2012). Revenue generated from Nigeria’s crude oil made up about 75% of the federal 
government’s income and 95% percent of exports in 2012 (IMF, 2013). In the first half of 2013, 
it is reported that the nation’s revenue from crude oil exports reached N6.7 trillion Naira – 
(Nigeria’s currency), or USD$42 billion. Also, in the year 2012, the United States Energy 
Information Administration placed the country’s revenue from crude oil at USD$93 billion 
(N14.8 trillion Naira) (US EIA, July 2013, p. 2).  
Karl (2007) sees rent seeking behavior as “efforts, both legal and illegal, to acquire 
access to or control over opportunities for earning rents” (p. 661). She explains further that the 
economic and political strength and sustenance of rentier states derive from  their ability to 
extract rents and royalties from external players (IOCs) and then distribute those rents internally 
among those elites and cartels that are supportive of the state’s economic and political policies 
(Karl, 2007). The FGN primarily has the responsibility to ensure that the business environment is 
conducive for foreign oil companies to remain, because the country is dependent on oil rents. 
However, as Omeje (2005) succinctly states, Nigeria’s rulers are more engaged in revenues 
generated from oil exploration and ways of stopping disruption in oil flow and less bothered 
about the complaints of the ND people (p. 322). In recent years, pressures have grown to 
diversify the nation’s economy away from the oil industry. In order to address the range of 
revenue management problems associated with Nigeria’s oil industry, new national regulation 
has been introduced, to which we now turn. 
 
 
                        Chapter one  
18 
 
 
The Petroleum Industry Bill. 
The revamping of Nigeria’s PI started in 2008 after a Presidential Committee 
recommended the need to overhaul the nation’s oil and gas industry. A Bill was created to this 
effect, called the Petroleum Industry Bill or PIB as it is popularly known (NEITI, 2014). 
Nigeria’s Petroleum Industry is suffused with challenges of funding of appropriate regulatory 
and monitoring agencies; issues with accountability; transparency; and efficiency, which the PIB 
intends to address (This day Newspaper, August, 2013). The PIB has generated a lot of intense 
public debate, as various stakeholders in the industry want to make contributions and 
recommendations before the Bill is passed. Initially proposed in 2008, the PIB has been under 
intense review since it was sent to the National Assembly for consideration. The aim of the Bill 
is outlined and discussed in chapter three. 
Methodology 
This Major Paper (MP) builds on analysis from fieldwork- a qualitative survey, 
interviews and ethnographic observations I carried out in Nigeria during my 2013 internship with 
Chevron Nigeria Limited (CNL).  These include the author’s attendance at a joint CNL/DPR 
Environmental Impact Assessment review workshop for CNL’s SONAM Non Associated Well 
development project; review of minutes of weekly meetings at the department of Policy 
Governance and Public Affairs (PGPA), CSR department at CNL, and information gathered 
from a visit to CNL’s Escravos Tank Farm in Delta State, August 2013. Interviews were 
conducted with managers and staff of CNL in the Facility Engineering/Major Capital Projects 
unit, (FE/MCP), Public Policy, Governance and Public Affairs (PGPA) and Health, Environment 
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and Safety (HES) departments. Further interviews were conducted with the Environment and 
Safety officers from the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) and the liaison officers 
between CNL and the National Petroleum Investment Management Services (NAPIMS), a 
division of the NNPC. CNL staffs interviewed were selected to include both indigenes of the 
Niger Delta and also people from non-oil producing states. These profiles helped in getting 
balanced responses based on an observed pattern of Chevron-community relationship, including 
what has changed over time, and what type of relationship exists between CNL and its cluster of 
communities. This design aimed to achieve a broad perspective and range of opinions.  Most 
interviewees had worked at CNL for a minimum period of 10 years. They were also mostly male 
based on the masculine nature of the offshore and onshore activities. 
 As envisioned, the staff from the ND displayed marked disenchantment at some of 
CNL’s activities, despite the company being their employer. Those from non-oil producing states 
were more detached and pragmatic in their approach and convictions. The interview questions 
focused on CNL and its CSR measures in relation to environmental sustainability, adherence to 
environmental laws and the relationship with the host communities. Although there were 
structured questions, the interviewees were given a platform to express their own views about the 
PI and CNL’s involvement with the communities. Secondary data used for this study were 
sourced from published reports and presentations, CSR articles and programs models and 
environmental stewardship procedure documents of CNL. Information was also gathered from 
books, government documents and websites, newspapers, and journals. This study, it is hoped, 
will add to the body of work on this subject that aims to effect social change through creating 
public awareness and further pressuring policy makers to make changes or create new policies. 
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Theoretical framework: Dependency theory 
 
Addressing development in Nigeria’s oil producing states (Niger Delta), calls for analysis 
of theories that examine economic, social and environmental aspects. Dependency theory is a 
Marxist approach examining the unequal relationship between developed economies and least 
developed economies in terms of longer term imperial relations that structure continued 
ownership and access to natural resources in the interests of Northern states to which these goods 
are exported. Dependency theory emerged as a critique of the modernization theory in the late 
1950s, under the direction of Raul Prebisch, the Director of United Nations Economic 
Commission for Latin America (Ferraro, 2008). In his paper, The Structure of Dependency, 
Theotonio Dos Santos (1971) emphasized the importance of history to his definition of 
dependency. He defines Dependency as  
An historical condition which shapes a certain structure of the world economy such that it 
favors some countries to the detriment of others and limits the development possibilities 
of the subordinate economics...a situation in which the economy of a certain group of 
countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy, to which 
their own is subjected. (p. 226). 
This study adopts this theory to look at the ND environmental, economic and social problems as 
the historical result of colonialism and dependency. One of these is the dependence of developed 
economies on so called less- developed economies to access natural resources with minimal 
interest in reinvesting the proceeds from such relationships in the source countries. In the Niger 
Delta region, pre-colonial and post-colonial histories are manifested in organizational behavior 
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of international oil corporations. This is discussed below in relation to oil extraction in Nigeria 
and the extractive activities of international oil corporations (IOCs), dissecting the causative 
factors of these lingering environmental and social challenges in the Niger Delta. Frank (1966) 
argues that developed economies got rich and continue to maintain and sustain their development 
standards. At the same time, the developmental status of the developing countries remain 
stagnant from constant draining of their human and natural resources. 
Resource Dependency Theory 
Resource Dependency theory emerged in 1978 in Jeffery Pfeffer and Gerald R.Salancik’s 
book The External Control of Organizations. The book argues that for a business to survive it 
has to depend on its external environment for the necessary raw materials needed. The use of 
Resource Dependency Theory (RDT) in this study reinforces the assertion that oil resource is the 
basis of power for the community and the object of the JV partnership between NNPC and IOCs. 
Therefore, a region where crude oil is found in abundance should also wield power (Nienhüser, 
2008, p. 12). This makes it logical that if CNL wants to give back to its cluster of communities in 
the ND, it should start by carrying out a comprehensive EIA procedure, strive for safer extractive 
practices, and investing in human and economic development. These steps should constitute 
CNL’s GMoU. The GMoU is discussed extensively in chapter four of this study.  
What results in different relationships of dependency in natural resources, according 
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003), is the power and influence of actors who control the natural 
resources and those actors who need these resources.  Omeje (2005) points out that crude oil is 
the life bone of Nigeria’s economy since it depends almost entirely on the rents, taxes, and 
royalties IOCs in the ND remit from oil exploration and also, from its share in the JV agreement 
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with the IOCs (p. 321). As a result, the FGN indirectly gives CNL and other IOCs leeway in its 
operations focusing more on deliverables rather than on environmental sustainability and nation 
building. This study adopts the Resource dependence theory to explore the uneven power 
relations between the IOCs and host communities on fair implementation of EIA on one hand 
and the regulatory agencies on the other hand.  This is based on the influence of IOCs on EIA 
studies and its project decision-making. The regulatory agencies (DPR) do not seem to have 
enough funding and operational independence to carry out their statutory functions (Field trip 
evidence). A third concept of choice for this study is the double standard, to which we now turn. 
Double Standard Concept 
The issue of foreign oil companies’ application of different standards in their extractive 
operations in Nigeria, when compared to what is obtainable elsewhere in developed economies, 
appears a double standard and indicates a need for attention to issue of global environmental 
justice. Double standards appear in the operations of CNL and other IOCs in the manner gas are 
flared; the importance and urgency for oil spill containment and also the cleanup process. Rather 
than attending to these problems, IOCs’ are distancing from the environmental damage while 
claiming that they are applying international best practices.  Yet recent studies, including the 
UNEP 2011
6
 study on Shells activities in the Ogoni area of Nigeria, indicate this is not so. The 
                                                          
6
 The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) was established in 1972 as an agency 
within the United Nations (UN). It is saddled with the responsibility as a facilitator, “catalyst, 
advocate” (UNEP, 2014) who assist developing countries in addressing and promoting measures 
at sustaining the environment. They sometimes assist in carrying out independent studies.  
In 2011, the UNEP team presented a report from its finding after a 14 months assessment of the 
extent of pollution in the Ogoni land axis of the Niger Delta oil producing region (UNEP, 2014). 
The outcome of the report was that the damage caused to the ND environment (land and water) 
is graver than believed. They continued that it would take between 25 – 30 years and an initial 
fund of USD$ 1 billion to start off the cleanup in the region.  
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double standard by definition is “a set of principles that applies differently and usually more 
rigorously to one group of people or circumstances than to another” (Merriam Webster 
Dictionary, 2014). Notably, Richard Steiner (2010), an environmentalist consultant and a former 
environmental policy and marine conservation professor at the University of Alaska, who has 
worked globally on and extensively published write ups on oil and environment for decades had 
this to say about the double standard concept. International corporations’, employ higher 
operational and environmental standards in industrialized countries than in non-industrialized 
countries, (p. 6).  Friends of the Earth International
7
, (FoEI), also underline similar double 
standards to that of Steiner. The explosion of British Petroleum (BP) Deepwater Horizon drilling 
rig April 2010, brought the discussion of the international oil companies’ double standard 
application based on ‘location’, to the front burner. The attention given to the BP incidence 
versus the ND nightmare indicates whose issue was worth more at the international level.  There 
was consistent media coverage and public outrage, in response to Deepwater Horizon. There was 
an estimation of impact to humans and animals.  In particular, there was massive attack and 
pressures on BP to compensate all those affected, and to immediately start cleanup exercises. 
And lastly, BP took responsibility for the incident and apologized to the public, especially to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
During my visit to the Department of Petroleum Resources, I sought for an insight into UNEP’s 
independent EIA study and it was very revealing. The response was that “UNEP’s independent 
EIA study and findings of Ogoni land, clean up and UN‘s projection are out of scope and 
mandate of DPR.” He continued that there was zero participation of DPR in UNEP’s findings. 
The report, he concluded had “a political ring to it” (Oral interview conducted, August 2013). 
 
7
   FoEI is one of the world’s largest not for profit grassroots environmental network, connecting 
several national groups and local environmental activist groups in every continent. The group has 
huge global support. They continue to spread the urgency for corporate bodies to address 
environmental issues resulting from their business operations and the social ills that comes with 
it. They call on corporate bodies to embrace social justice and environmental sustainability 
(FoEI, 2014) by using the same international standards in every country they operate despite the 
location.   
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those affected. All these sustained efforts at addressing BP’s Deepwater rig explosion stirred up 
anger among many international environmental activists groups. Bad as the BP Deepwater 
explosion was (BP does not operate in Nigeria), it is a tip of the iceberg compared to what the 
people of the Niger Delta have been accustomed to over decades. On the basis of this 
background, we now proceed to Chapter two to examine EIA process in Nigeria’s PI focusing on 
CNL’s in-house environmental stewardship process. 
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Contesting Environmental Impact Assessment in Nigeria: A case study of Chevron Nigeria 
Limited’s EIA Process 
Introduction 
It is common knowledge that oil exploration and production processes pollute and disrupt 
the environment, which in turn drastically alters a community’s ecosystem, socio-economic 
balance and cultural orientation. In areas dependent on agrarian lifestyles the destruction of the 
green vegetation that predated extractive activities denies the indigenes of their economic 
mainstay. Forced relocation of populations and human rights infringements also affect the 
societal culture and psyche. In principle, the formal environmental assessment undertaken before 
extractive activities begin is intended to restrict or compensate for these impacts. In practice, 
however, socio-economic displacement with minimal mitigation is the norm in many industrial 
sites. Oil exploration and extraction lead to several negative environmental impacts. Economic 
globalization, both under colonialism and in post-colonial times, has contributed to oil majors 
circumventing their responsibilities for ecological damages at the site of crude oil extractions. 
IOCs capitalize on weak regulatory institutions and corrupt governments to operate below the 
standards acceptable in their home countries. These negative social, economic and environmental 
lapses are primarily borne by the host communities and the larger society without due 
recompense from the defaulting firms. EIA processes have been developed and standardized 
internationally to address and prevent such problems, but IOCs still exploit loopholes to reduce 
their costs and increase their profit margin. I argue that best responsible business practices under 
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the umbrella of ‘CSR’ programs should require extensive and rigorous environmental assessment 
(EA) for all projects (Field work data, August 2013). 
This chapter examines the limitations of EIA standards and environmental sustainability 
in the ND, Nigeria- through the lens of CNL in- house Environmental Stewardship process. The 
findings reveal that CNL’s EIA procedure and scope falls short of the standards they maintain in 
developed economies where they are held to greater account.  This inference is drawn from 
observations made during an EIA review workshop as well as interviews conducted within CNL 
and the regulatory agencies. Through this research I observed a sense of apathy towards 
regeneration of brownfields from oil exploration and production in the ND on the part of IOC’s 
and FGN. Information gathered, showed a pattern suggesting that this problem is industry wide. 
Shell Nigeria for instance was barred from operating in Ogoni land for many years, with the 
caveat that they might come back only after cleaning the pollution they caused and paying 
adequate compensation to the community. Shell is still not operating in Ogoni land (see UNEP 
Ogoni report, August 2011). The process of environmental remediation and restitution cost Shell 
billions of dollars. CNL and other IOCs operating in this region tend to put cost before the 
environment during EIA deliberations. CNL insists that it follows the same international 
standards as other Chevron subsidiaries internationally and also stresses that its in-house EIA 
standard (ESHIA), is more effective than those mapped in DPR environmental handbook 
EGASPIN (which will be discussed later). Evidence from the EIA review workshop I attended 
indicated that this might not be entirely so, based on the reaction of CNL staff when confronted 
with the apparent omission of a core EIA component. 
EGASPIN is the environmental regulatory handbook compiled by DPR. The document 
was first compiled in 1991 and later reviewed in 2002. In compiling EGASPIN, DPR extracted 
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all the environmental laws and the various Mineral laws governing the PI. The handbook lays out 
all the environmental laws with legal requirements and guides all environmental liabilities and 
regulations of Nigeria’s PI. The handbook is reviewed and updated every ten years to incorporate 
more effective regulations for the industry. The lack of effective environmental regulations in 
Nigeria’s oil and gas industry leads to environmental pollution, which is discussed next. 
Common causes of environmental pollution 
Environmental degradation studies have established verifiable negative results from 
continuous human activities on the environment. In the ND, oil exploration, production and 
transportation are known to cause most environmental pollution. This generally affects the land, 
soil and air of the region. Johnson, Ambrose and Bassett (1997) define environmental 
degradation as; “any change or disturbance to the environment perceived to be deleterious or 
undesirable” (p. 584).  Environmental degradation resulting from oil extraction in the ND 
happens in the remote villages and communities. These clusters of communities are far removed 
from the cities where decisions that impact them and their environment are taken. The Nigerian 
elite in the big cities do not have firsthand knowledge of the grave environmental pollution from 
oil spills, gas flaring and waste dumping from oil exploration, and therefore are disinclined to 
mount political pressure for legislative action. Indeed, Kakonge (2006) emphasizes that the 
absence of active participation of the political class in addressing environmental issues in 
developing countries is because it does not directly affect them. This according to Kagonge 
indicates why the environment is not regarded as top priority, unless “other pressing needs for 
economic development are addressed” (p .18). This paper however is of the opinion that a 
blueprint for the environment must involve short term and long term plans on how to address the 
incidences of environmental damage and a course of action for remediation.  
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Oil Spillages 
 A major contributor to environmental pollution is oil spillage. The ND is one of the most 
polluted regions in the world, with more than 6,800 recorded oil spills excluding unreported 
spills, amounting to about nine million to thirteen million barrels of spilled oil (CNN World, 
2010). These spills are mainly from corroded aging oil pipelines, vandalized pipes, oil bunkering 
and extractive activities including transportation of the product (Meredith, 2005; Omeje 2006; 
Edoho, 2008; Steiner, 2010). Oil spill in the ND is a common phenomenon. In fact, Edoho, 
(2008) indicates that the intensity and gravity of oil spills in the ND by IOCs is close to 
“ecocide” (p. 214). The magnitude of these spills in the region  results in  land depletion, 
destruction of mangroves and wetlands, displacement of communities, disruption of ecological, 
social, cultural and religious attachments to the environment. Edoho concludes that oil extraction 
and production is a perilous project (p. 214). Environmental damage resulting from oil spills has 
been known to trigger violent strife between the communities and oil firms. This strife has 
brought the emergence of both environmental NGOs and militant groups to the ND.  
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Figure 4: Images showing abandoned fishing boats due to oil spill in the Niger Delta.  
Photo source: Pius Utomi Ekpei AFP/Getty Images 
 
Oil Bunkering/Theft 
Most recently, Oil bunkering has been labeled as the biggest cause of environmental 
pollution in the Niger Delta. Oil Bunkering is mostly carried out by organized cartels that 
sometimes include the elite, military and militants. Usually when syphoning or stealing the oil 
are done loading their ships and vessels, the oil pipelines are left open, releasing uncontrollable 
amount of crude oil to land and water (Data from field work, 2013). Oil bunkering is the stealing 
of crude oil from “criminally drilled holes on oil pipelines, and refining the crude oil” (Zabbey, 
2009, p. 4).  Bunkered crude is usually loaded to vessels for sale abroad while sometimes such 
crude is refined by the many illegal mini refineries scattered in the swamps of the region 
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     Bunkering is also carried out by small time thieves, who operate in remote areas of the 
pipeline, siphoning the product and carting it away with trucks. In some instances, their activities 
have attracted the attention of indigenes that flock to the sites with jerry cans. Such cases are 
known to have led to explosions and loss of lives. One example of this occurred in Jessetown, a 
small community in Delta state where an oil pipeline explosion in the year 1998 claimed over 
1000 lives (Whig 1998). CNL believes that communities sometimes do not report ruptured 
pipelines because of this practice of stealing the product. By the time the firm’s attention is 
called, immense damage may have been done to the environment (Oral interview July, 2013). 
The communities on the other hand argue that CNL is slow to respond to ruptures because the 
firm is not required to deliver adequate compensation for damages caused by spillages. 
This whole process of oil theft and crude refining method results in extensive and 
uncontrollable oil spills into the environment, adversely affecting plants and animals  (Oral 
interviews conducted with CNL staffs, July 2013).  Most CNL staffs interviewed were quick to 
point at oil bunkering as the main cause of the extensive environmental devastation in the region. 
This blame game however does not seem to convince skeptics who believe that IOCs are 
culpable for most of the damages caused the environment in the region. Oil theft and illegal 
trading of ND’s refined oil started gradually in the 1980s and skyrocketed in the late 1990s – 
2000, due to high price of oil in the global market (Ikelegbe, 2005, p. 221; Onuoha, 2008).  
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Willful Vandalism 
Willful rupture of pipelines, or sabotage should not be viewed in isolation, but as a factor 
that also encourages oil bunkering
8
 (theft), serving as protest point for activists wishing to 
drastically attract the attention of the IOCs and the international community. Willful vandalism is 
an act of deliberately or intentionally destroying or damaging public or private property (the free 
Dictionary). In this context, it is the intentional act of destroying oil pipelines, as a protest to the 
perceived injustices by the oil majors. An example of willful vandalization of a CNL oil pipeline 
is a January 8th, 2010 attack by the prominent rebel group Movement for the Emancipation of 
the Niger Delta People (MEND) that led to the closure of its Makaraba - Utonana platform 
located around 100 kilometers from Warri Delta State (US Africa, 2010).  
 Evidence from this fieldwork showed that, ideally CNL’s monitoring unit on a project 
site reports to the oil spill containment department as soon as there is a drop in pressure of an oil 
pipeline. This drop signifies a leaking oil pipeline, prompting the oil spill containment 
department to ‘shut in’ (stop) production.  CNL duly points out that sometimes in cases where 
the pipelines are located in swampy sites; detection takes time because it requires the use of a 
helicopter to survey the site to identify the points where pressure dropped. In spite of these ‘swift 
efforts’ at containing oil spills, CNL complains that sometimes the communities hinder them 
from cleaning up a spill until crude oil has covered a large mass of land. The intention of the 
                                                          
8
 Willful rupture of oil pipelines is premeditated vandalization of the pipelines as a form of 
protest against some exploitative tendencies by the IOCs operating in the ND. Oil bunkering on 
the other hand is an unauthorized forced access to the crude being transported by the oil 
pipelines, mainly by cartels, elites and restive youths. 
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communities here, CNL argues, is to gain press coverages to support environmental pollution 
claims and seek monetary compensation.  
CNL, like most IOCs operating in Nigeria, has been accused by environmental rights 
activists of disregarding legal provisions of international environmental treaties to which Nigeria 
is signatory and to which, as they point out, ‘these companies’ adhere  to in their operations 
elsewhere in the world’ (Omoweh, 2005). This trend of nonchalance towards environmental 
pollution, oil spills and cleanup from their operations clearly depicts the doctrine of ‘double 
standard’ (Steiner, 2010; Friends of the Earth International, 2010). Notably, Steiner (2010) made 
this conclusion following his extensive research on the ND and its environmental woes. As 
discussed in the opening chapter, Steiner compared the behavior of IOCs in the ND to that of 
their operations in advanced societies and called it a ‘Double Standard’. Such behavior he 
concludes is not commonly tolerated and/or acceptable in developed countries, because their 
strict environmental laws forbid it. For example, gas flaring; oil spill containment and cleanup 
are more strictly monitored in the Global North countries. 
History of EIA 
It is known that EIA faces similar challenges globally. However, with the lens of the 
double standard concept, EIA process in Nigeria’s PI suffers more extreme inadequacies. EIA is 
a rational, precautionary approach to creating policy for environmental sustainability. This 
precautionary measure emerged in the 1960s due to extensive environmental damage from 
human activities.  Economists discovered for a century that human interaction with nature could 
disrupt the environment (Brooks, 1992, p. 402) and then effect economic activities and 
sustenance of the inhabitants who live and depend on it. The United State Congress under its 
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National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 first introduced the use of EIA in that 
country. This was as a result of public interest and outrage over the state of the environment (Jay, 
Jones, Slinn and Wood 2007). EIA is now seen and used as a vital environmental management 
instrument (Morgan, 2012), and widely used in over 100 countries, mostly in developing 
countries for major capital projects (Jay et al, 2007). However, this vital tool faces many 
criticisms for its lack of effectiveness in meeting and evaluating the necessary scopes therein 
(Morgan, 2012).  DPR, one of the core regulatory bodies within the Nigeria’s PI, defines EIA as 
a process that: 
Documents the actual impacts in relationship to the predicted impacts of the 
project/activity/action. It potentially controls and manages the timing, location and levels 
of impacts and also provides the cause and effect data for the empirical verification or 
validation of various predictive models of action/impact relationships (EGASPIN 2002). 
Similar to DPR’s definition of EIA, Marzuki, (2009) indicates that ideally, EIA should 
“measure the benefit or cost from physical development to the public and community” (p. 126).  
Whereas it is arguable that oil production must involve some form of damage to the 
environment, it is common knowledge that “the environmental effects of extractive projects are 
influenced by the type of minerals extracted, the technology used, the scale of extraction 
activities and the location of the projects” (Janneh and Ping, 2011, p. 46). As I will discuss 
further below, at the joint CNL/DPR EIA review workshop I attended in 2013, the following 
project evaluation measures were undertaken:  ranking of environmental aspects, impact 
identification, impact characterization, impact significance, impact categorization, 
consequences/likelihood evaluation and impacts significance ranking. This is intended to create a 
management plan and mitigation measures for possible impacts from a project.  
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The introduction of EIA in Nigeria. 
 EIA was introduced in Nigeria in 1992. This was after Nigeria’s attendance at the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), which took place in Rio de 
Janeiro from third to fourteenth of June, 1992, (Nwoko, 2013). The EGASPIN handbook (2002) 
states that the decision to introduce this environmental sustainability policy was taken after a 
series of studies  showing that the extractive activities from oil exploration were manifesting 
changes in the Niger Delta’s aquatic and terrestrial ecosystem. And these changes appeared to be 
extending towards disrupting historical, economic, and cultural resources of the local 
communities (part V111: A).  With the intention to protect the ecology (water courses, air and 
soil) given these growing negative changes to the environment, the government felt the urgent 
need to introduce EIA policy. The government intended the EIA process to enable protection, 
restoration and clean-up of oil-spilled sites during and after exploration. The EGASPIN 
handbook also showed that with the enactment of an EIA the DPR promised to “properly plan 
for and monitor new installations or projects to prevent degradation of the environment” 
EGASPIN, 2002). However, this promise has not been met, based on the poor state of the ND 
environment and the government’s helplessness at addressing the gravity of the issue.  
It is noteworthy to express that challenges in EIA processes are not particular to 
developing countries alone (see Gibson, 2012; Mulhivill and Baker, 2001). Developed countries 
also face the various challenges to EIA process. The only obvious difference is that the 
magnitude of environmental damage evident in the ND, of which IOCs’ are guilty, would not be 
allowed in any western country (Steiner, 2010). An example is the outrage and swift action 
during BP’s oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico discussed above. The local communities blame CNL 
including (other IOCs) and the FGN for not implementing and /or innovating safer ways to 
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manage the deplorable state of the environment. According to EGASPIN (2002) handbook, an 
environmental management plan is vital for EIA. After assessing and prioritizing the key impact 
assessments, a management planning team is set up to arrange an aspect register to help identify 
and discuss the management and/or implementation of commitments to stakeholders. This 
contrasts with Cashmore et al (2004)’s  opinion that the value an EIA brings to a project “both to 
consent decisions and to project design, is generally moderate rather than substantial” (p. 291); 
and that it is not surprising for “decision makers to circumvent EIA mechanisms where this is 
convenient… it is common for the findings of EIA to be marginalized in favor of other 
considerations, such as non-environmental objectives and political factors” (Wood, 2003, p. 239 
as quoted in Jay et al, 2007, p. 291).  
EIA is a mandatory requirement to be met before the issuance of oil drilling license in 
Nigeria for major capital projects (MCP). According to CNL, MCPs are projects in which the 
firm has a share value (the percentage in financial contribution and in revenue sharing in a 
project) of more than USD$50 million in the CNL/NNPC Joint venture agreement. However it is 
obvious that despite CNL’s in-house environmental management stewardship process ESHIA 
and the PI regulatory standards and guidelines, the   environment is still ravaged by extractive 
activities. The question is therefore raised as per the veracity of these impact studies as well as 
the adherence and capacity of government to sanction firms when there are breaches. There 
appears ample evidence that DPR does not have strong oversight authority over CNL, mostly 
due to unavailability of the necessary tools to function effectively. For example a DPR officer 
told me during interview that the organization does not have a helicopter which is needed for on-
spot inspection of IOCs operations. He said they sometimes have to wait on the IOCs to provide 
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one before they can visit them for inspection. The following section, examines effectiveness of 
CNL’s ESHIA process towards environmental sustainability in the ND.  
Chevron Nigeria Limited Environment, Social and Health Impact Assessment (ESHIA) 
process. 
As outlined in the introduction to this paper, ESHIA is Chevron’s in-house environmental 
management stewardship process geared towards achieving environmental sustainability and 
development through its environmental performance standards, known as Operational Excellence 
(OE) for all CNL Project Development and Execution Process (CPDEP) (Chevron, n.d). This 
process informs CNL’s “business decision making” (Chevron, 2009) through a consistent 
identification and management of potentially significant environmental, social and health 
impacts over a project’s duration. Chevron states that its ESHIA process is beyond compliance to 
local regulations and standards, that is, the firm’s environmental management process is more 
effective than Nigeria PI (Interview data, August, 2013), but it “must be aligned with local 
regulations and requirement for impact assessment-type activities” (Chevron, 2009).  CNL’s 
ESHIA process runs through five phases. These are; 
a) Screening 
b) Scoping:  
c) Impact assessment 
d) Stakeholder engagement and  
e) ESHIA management plan. 
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There is, however, an additional phase, the pre-screening
9
 process, but CNL states that 
this process is not formally required by regulation (Chevron: NMA n.d). The goal of ESHIA is to 
discover and manage environmental impacts whether positive or negative, on the host 
communities and their environment that may result from the firm’s operational activities. In 
CNL, the environmental studies unit, under the Health, Environment and Safety (HES) 
department, manages drilling, development projects and the planning and execution of new 
exploration projects.   
ESHIA Scoping process 
The Scoping procedure in the ESHIA framework is a crucial phase in Chevron Nigeria 
Limited’s operations. This is because Scoping is based on more comprehensive particulars 
indicated from the Screening process. This phase entails meticulous explanation of the potential 
impacts from a project, and plans for management and mitigation (Chevron, 2009) and intends to 
“identify and confirm the issues to be addressed in the Impact Assessment on the most 
potentially significant environmental, social or health impacts associated with the project; and 
defines the proper scale; planning and execution of the Impact Assessment” (Chevron, Scoping 
Report Instructions and Excerpts, n.d). This phase maps out all the needed information and 
approximate estimation of the Impact Assessment process. ESHIA process is based on the value 
of CNL’s capital share in a project based on the JV agreement with NNPC. The size of the 
project determines if an extensive EIA is required or just an in house pre-screening and 
                                                          
9
 The pre-screening phase in CNL’s environmental stewardship process helps to detect whether a 
project may generate destructive and harmful impacts to the locals around the proposed site 
(Chevron, 2009). 
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screening. Whichever is the case, CNL must follow the requirements and standards laid out in 
the EGASPIN manual.  
Scope of Work in EIA approval 
An interesting and all important aspect of ESHIA Scoping process is the “Scope of 
Work” (SOW). This is a report that is sent to the federal ministry of environment (FEMev) 
detailing the Impact Assessment from the Scoping (Chevron, 2013). The ‘Scope of Work’ 
(SOW) phase is widely accepted and seen as the most important in EIA in both developed and 
least developed economies (Bisset, 1992). This is because it gives a detailed description of 
Terms of Reference (TOR). The TOR usually contains identified and confirmed vital issues; 
proposed methodology for the EIA; details of assessments; a schedule reporting layout; and 
focuses the Impact Assessment on the agreed key issues (Chevron, 2009). ESHIA addresses the 
existing conditions of which potential project impact can be measured and managed. Conducting 
the baseline assessment for ESHIA study takes at least 6-12 months and sometimes longer due to 
seasonality factors (Chevron, 2009).   
Even though CNL announces its ESHIA Scoping Report will address social and health 
issues that may result from their operations, it categorically states “Chevron may wish to 
consider carefully prior to making any public disclosure of the company’s intent or 
commitments” (Chevron, 2009). This makes it rather speculative the degree of fairness of the 
process as observations suggest that the cost factor usually trumps other considerations during 
decision-making. This chapter reflects the unwillingness of CNL to volunteer information, on the 
backdrop of the pervasive confidentiality clauses permeating their corporate space. This is more 
so, considering Bisset’s (1992) indication that EIA reports are held with excessive confidentiality 
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and secrecy in least developed economies. The ministry’s DPR and FMEnv and IOCs will 
provide copies of the formal EIA reports, at least in some cases, although they are frequently 
poorly done (as in Canada). Evidence from this chapter however shows that there appears a 
conspiratorial silence between CNL and the Federal Government when some key environmental 
benchmarks are not met, especially when it is mutually beneficial to both, to the exclusion of the 
host communities. Examples I observed at a joint EIA review workshop between CNL and the 
DPR included (1) the limitation of the fishery survey for a Major Capital Project, and (2) 
narrowing of the Scope of Work in the EIA.  
In the case of the fishery survey, a CNL representative suggested that they will use a 
previous fishery study from another project.  In the face of this clear inadequacy in the 
assessment, the DPR representatives appeared helpless and reminded the firm’s staff that each 
project should have its own extensive study including a fishery survey (field work data, July 
2013). Hence employing a study from another project should not be contemplated.  Also, on 
narrowing of the scope of work, DPR officers noticed that the 12 gas pipeline slots they initially 
approved for the SONAM Non Associated Well development project had been reduced to 9. 
They pointed out that since the project is a MCP, the initial number of gas pipelines approved 
should be developed for the project. Upon further interrogation by the DPR officers, the project 
engineer from CNL informed DPR that the Federal government is aware of the adjustment. The 
DPR officers told CNL team that for record-keepings purposes they would have to forward their 
department the emails to keep on file. After the workshop, this research sought further 
clarification on both the fishery study and the alteration of the scope of work from a CNL staff 
who informed that “normally CNL does not drill all the wells it states for projects. For the 
SONAM Gas well project, CNL intends to drill 9 and then drill the remaining 3 in the future, 
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although this was not disclosed in the scope of work. These three, they claim are buffers in case 
they encounter error during drilling as it will help mitigate cost of such errors. (Oral interview, 
2013). The underlining reason for the non-disclosure this research however uncovers is that 
sometimes in the future CNL may drill the remaining 3 wells without recourse to DPR.  
The scoping process of CNL ESHIA appears very organized with assumptions that the 
right thing will be done. That is, the impact assessment will be carried out and social, 
environmental and health impacts will be mitigated or minimized. Yet at the same time, CNL 
states that in expanding and analyzing various options for feasible alternative mitigation 
measures, it will select options that will raise the maximum economic value for the firm. It won’t 
be surprising then, that in a bid to maximize profit they may be willing to avoid operational and 
sometimes environmental costs to achieve its business goal.  
Contesting the Scope of CNLs EIA 
A principal aspect of EIA credibility and acceptance is the broad spectrum of 
stakeholders that make input and are agreeable to not only the content of EIA report, but also the 
effectiveness. The primary victims of pollution are those domiciled in the ND, followed by the 
larger society, which in one way or another is affected by the consequences of environmental 
damage. It therefore behooves IOCs like CNL to inculcate the expectations of the greatest 
number of participants, as that gives legitimacy to the process. Public participation in EIA 
decision-making is a very important criterion for natural resource and environmental 
management (Booth and Halseth, 2011; Schusler et al, 2013; Webler et al, 2001). This is because 
it “encourages the promotion of deliberative and collaborative approaches to planning and 
decision making processes (Morgan, 2012, p.8). Part V111: section 7.1.4.2 of the EGASPIN 
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handbook states that “workshops and/or public forum by experts shall be conducted by the 
proponent to consider the EIA report prior to obtaining an approval or environmental permit at 
the discretion of the Director of Petroleum Resources”.  Data gathered during field work showed 
that in the ESHIA process, a public hearing after an approved EIA report is not organized by the 
firm, but by the Federal Ministry of Environment (FEMev).  
Upon completion of an EIA, the DPR sends copies of the approved report to the FEMev. 
The FEMev publishes the report for the public to read and make comments. This phase lasts for 
21 working days after which a public hearing is organized. At the public hearing, all stakeholders 
including professionals and of course the communities are expected to attend. Based on data 
from interviews I conducted for this chapter with participants at a public hearing, I argue that 
apart from a few professionals in attendance, the average participant is not sufficiently literate or 
technically equipped to proffer alternative suggestions, because of costs involved in alternative 
research. This therefore creates the need for greater awareness as well as funding for 
organizations to conduct independent research on EIA for specific projects. CNL, on the other 
hand states that its ESHIA report is an “internal Chevron process and as such documents are not 
made available to the public, unless it specifically decided to do so” (Chevron, 2009) for 
comments. I find this rather ambiguous, because CLNs EIA assessments seem to be made with 
minimal public participation (PP) from the cluster of communities that bear the potential 
consequences of flawed EIA process. There have been extensive research findings (see Bravante 
and Holden, 2009; Kakonje, 2006; Olokesusi, 1992) on public participation as a procedural 
weakness in EIA processes in developing countries as well as in developed economies.  
For EIA framework to be effective, all parties involved including the government, IOCs, 
Supervisory agencies, indigenous communities and social movements must work in tandem 
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towards the overall success of the process. This means that the process must be seen to be 
transparent and inclusive. The regulatory agencies must be adequately equipped to monitor the 
process from inception to the period when the exploration and production is done. As such, they 
should be the party that is held liable if the process is flawed, and should therefore be 
constitutionally empowered to sanction the IOC when necessary, independent from political 
interference. The qualification and integrity of the consulting firms chosen to conduct EIA 
studies must not be in doubt. The EGASPIN handbook states that, “EIA consultants and 
reviewers shall be competent and shall have attended prescribed courses in principles and 
practice of EIA process and Environmental Management, relating to the determination of the 
feasibility of projects” (Part V111: 3.3.2).  Yet on the contrary, evidence from the joint 
CNL/DPR EIA review workshop attended during my fieldwork showcased an inefficient EIA 
consulting firm. For example, after presentations of the EIA report from CNL project engineer 
and the consulting firm, DPR officials asked the consulting firm which EIA Evaluation Model 
and Metrics was used to arrive at their decision, to which he could not name one. EIA evaluation 
metrics and models are measures and/or techniques used to describe, review, summarize and 
explain the impacts of the proposed project to health, social, cultural and environmental aspects 
of the communities living within and around the project sites (Interview at DPR, August 2013). 
The lack of response to this crucial question made the DPR officials question the authenticity of 
the interdisciplinary team listed on the report. One of the DPR officials asked the consultants if 
actually those ‘subject matter experts’ listed truly conducted the EIA study. My observations 
here square with the work of Akpomuvre (2011) who states that IOCs influence the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) system by awarding EIA studies to inefficient but 
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influential consultants, who turn in poor and unsatisfactory reports to fulfill DPR requirements 
(p. 205). 
Another troubling observation was that CNL’s environmental studies team could not 
answer the above question that had been posed to the consulting team. Normally one would 
expect that when an EIA study is contracted out, the firm should inspect the project to be sure all 
standards and measures be met. Rather they seemed more concerned for the DPR to approve the 
EIA report for the next level of action. Here I noted a conflict of interest in the environmental 
consulting companies that carry out environmental assessments EA. The hiring process of EIA 
consultants must be above board. IOCs are known to always look out for quick fix ways to 
address environmental issues rather than dealing with the main cause. They sometimes hire 
environmental consulting firms whom they fund. To show reciprocal favor these consulting 
firms often do the bidding of their benefactors.  At the end of such EIA outcomes, they make 
public disclosures that appear transparent, when actually they may not be. As a result, Slack 
(2012) mentions that these EA consulting firms should be properly trained in EA process. He 
concludes that such reciprocal behavior from EIA consultants often save costs for corporations 
that use them and also assures the agencies of more jobs and also referral to other firms (p. 181). 
At this EIA workshop, I also observed that costing of the project was shrouded in 
secrecy. Though the Scoping report is supposed to have a cost estimation stated, the project’s 
estimated cost was not divulged in the review workshop. The firm’s representative stated they 
could not do so because no estimated amount has been agreed upon internally within the firm’s 
management as yet. They alluded to the fact that it is a MCP (Ethnographic observation, 2013) 
and presumably, cost estimation information is included in negotiations with government based 
on the JV agreement. To indicate the significance of this, Slack, (2005) contends that IOCs 
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frequently trivialize or avoid explaining the costs of their operations and their impact on the host 
communities and their environment, while exaggerating the opportunities the project will 
generate (p. 180). 
Another limitation of EIA is that it does not seem to achieve the desired effect for which 
it is carried out. To most observers, the process is not effective because pollution is still 
pervasive and IOCs seem helpless in restoring explored sites to their original form (Jay et al, 
2007). The challenges of environmental restoration are not only addressed through direct clean-
up, but might necessitate the planting of enzymes that will initiate the restoration of the ecology. 
These processes are very expensive and time consuming to carry out, making it imperative that 
IOCs carry out credible studies that will alleviate or prevent environmental damage. 
In the case of CNL’s EIA, the efficiency of the survey tends to be defined by the scope of 
the study. A projects importance must be relative to how it benefits all parties involved and not 
be predicated on financial considerations alone. This is a view shared by Jay et al (2007), when 
they state that sometimes EIA might result in the stoppage of a project, as the effectiveness of an 
EIA should prove how much cost versus benefit it has for the environment and on the lives of 
those living around the proximity (p. 288-290). As revealed during interviews for this chapter, 
when there is a foreseen major impact from a project to communities or marine life, such 
projects are rerouted. That is, the firm would avoid impacts if possible or come up with safer and 
lesser impactful alternatives. For instance, CNL may re-channel an oil pipeline that would have 
initially gone through residential or water courses via a safer route (Oral conversation, with a 
CNL staff, September, 2013). In practice, this is not always so, because CNL and other IOCs 
exert influence to get their way, if a project is crucial to their corporate interest. Suffice it to say 
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that for Chevron, scoping EIA appears an administrative requirement, rather than a procedurally 
mandatory or meaningfully-fulfilled requirement for the approval of projects.  
In analyzing government’s oversight of environmental assessment, this section takes into 
account the overwhelming influence of the company both locally and globally. Considering DPR 
is set up to act and take decisions on behalf of the government concerning environmental 
regulations in the oil and gas industry, data gathered during field-work shows the agency does 
not seem to practically wield the autonomy to take certain decisions when the need arises. As 
such, do the regulatory agencies such as DPR have the authority to enforce the regulations 
associated with EIA that the state officially assumes?  An example of how the DPR’s work is 
being reinforced is the creation of two new regulatory bodies in 2007 to monitor oil companies 
following pressure from the general public, and the oil communities. The two new regulatory 
agencies are the National Oil Spillage Detection and Rapid Response (NOSDRA) and the 
National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (NESREA) (Ojo, 
2012). These are independent agencies under the Nigeria Federal Ministry of environment.  
However, like the DPR these two new agencies face the same challenge of not having the 
financial and technological capability to carry out the tasks they are set up to do (Ojo, 2012, p. 
15).  
These new agencies are meant to carry out independent studies through their agencies to 
ascertain the integrity of environmental assessments (EA) carried out by IOCs. But I would 
argue that the duplication of this function which should normally be that of the DPR is an 
indictment on the political class. It will appear more expedient, if host communities are 
statutorily mandated to carry out their own survey, with an independent body set up to audit the 
surveys for major capital projects. Organizations such as Environmental Rights Action (ERA) 
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and other environmental NGOs do occasionally carry out independent studies it must be pointed 
out. 
Political interference from elites and political class in Nigeria is another challenge facing 
effective implementation of the EIA process in the ND. Many politicians, private business 
entrepreneurs and traditional rulers have high stakes in the Nigerian oil industry, with some 
owning oil blocs. Nwajiaku-Dahou (2012) bemoans that revenue from the owning of oil blocs, a 
new form of acquiring contracts, is the new money making platform for politicians, business men 
and women and top military personnel  (p. 298). This opportunity to directly access oil money is 
a disincentive to the above listed elites of the country to fight for redress for local ND 
communities demanding for amelioration of their suffering and for environmental justice. 
Consistent with this fact, the influential elites in Nigeria perpetuate these acts of exploitation for 
their selfish ends. All these behaviors support the “functioning of an intensive machinery of rent 
seeking and political patronage (p. 119). It is pertinent to stress at this point that political 
influence in EIA process, as posited by Broad (1995), is not necessarily a display of failure in 
policy and decision making in both the state and IOCs, rather it is an evidence of political 
influence in the management of natural resources for the benefit of those who control the state 
(p. 331). But this underlines a key point revealed in this chapter: most decisions taken by 
government are not motivated by the common good of society, but by embedded economic and 
political interests.  
Conclusion 
My observations of the CNL/DPR EIA review workshop indicated that there are 
limitations in the scope of work of CNL’s ESHIA process. Also problematic is the firm’s use of 
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inefficient for - profit environmental consultancies for EIA studies. EIA studies, this chapter 
argues, appear more as an obligatory and administrative procedure and neglect key points that 
need more attention and study.  CNL has to prove by its actions and decision making, and not 
just by statement, that it does not operate double standards in its business dealing in Nigeria. 
Instead, CNL tends to influence the effectiveness and scope of coverage of EIAs they 
commission, as evidences from this study support. Comprehensive EIA of a green field (new oil 
fields) should involve demonstrating how the input from EIA is incorporated into projects 
design, methodology and philosophy. This chapter however argues that beyond the issue of cost, 
a refusal to carry out a fishery study should affect the approval of the project by the regulatory 
body. In the example I observed, this flaw – the lack of a fishery study- diminishes the integrity 
of CNL’s ESHIA and contradicts the claim in its handbook that the advantage of ESHIA in EIA 
is to help avoid accusations of “inflicted harm on the environment, public health or 
socioeconomics … by documenting Chevron’s reasonable and best efforts to ascertain and 
mitigate potentially significant impacts” (Chevron, 2010).  
This chapter shows that in order to minimize spillages, the life cycle of pipelines should 
be reviewed, as that would be more beneficial in the long term than having to shut in and incur 
huge production downtime. The life span of pipelines should be inculcated in EIA reports, and 
should factor in varied terrains and propensity for willful rupture. Considering the capital outlay 
required for laying new pipelines, reciprocal contributions between the IOCs and Nigerian state 
is recommended.
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Implementing transparency and accountability in Nigeria’s Petroleum Industry 
Introduction 
It is impossible to engage the realities of poverty, environmental depletion, and 
inequitable distribution of ‘petro dollars’ in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, without tackling the issue 
of deep seated corruption, inefficiency, and mismanagement of natural resource revenues by 
government officials. There is an overriding consensus that the tendency within capitalism to 
pursue profit under globalization has been exploited by Chevron Nigeria and other IOCs, 
especially in countries with weak state structures like Nigeria. Corruption in Nigeria many 
believe should be viewed from the historical perspective of governance post-independence (Karl, 
1997). The atmosphere of impunity of the political class is a hangover of successive despotic 
regimes that ruled the country through military coups.  I argue in this chapter that although 
Nigeria is a member of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), generating huge 
revenue from the venture, it unfortunately has failed to utilize its crude oil revenue as an engine 
for sustainable development. The fixation of Nigeria elites on ‘oil’, to the exclusion of other 
economic resources, has negatively affected the potentials of the country. The groundnut 
pyramids of the Northern region and the cocoa produce of the western region were neglected 
with the discovery of crude oil in commercial quantity. 
This chapter identifies two challenges facing the achievement of sustainable development 
in Nigeria. The first includes corruption of government officials, weak democratic regimes, 
mismanagement of funds, and dysfunctional state institutions that foster deficiencies in policy 
guidelines and their implementation. The second concerns how foreign dominated oil companies 
operating in the Niger Delta capitalize on and take advantage of the vulnerabilities in the system 
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deepened by the first challenge. For example, Chevron Nigeria complains that the failure of the 
Nigeria State to cater for its citizens, especially in the Niger Delta, is why its corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) efforts are seen as inadequate and incommensurate. This chapter argues that 
the government has not created an enabling environment for CSR to flourish in the ND. 
Government’s lack of political will shapes conditions that make corporate social responsibility 
programs ineffective. The chapter concludes that commitment to sustainable development in 
Nigeria and the Niger Delta particularly has to come from integration of both state government 
and IOCs. 
The disparity in the scale of development in OPEC member countries seems very huge, 
based on each country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Merriam Webster online dictionary 
defines Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as the “total value of the goods and services produced by 
the people of a nation during a year not including the value of income earned in foreign 
countries” (Merriam Webster Dictionary, 2014). From OPEC data, here’s a look at the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of some OPEC member countries- Algeria’s GDP is $ 5,204; 
Libya $12,777; Venezuela $12,956; Saudi Arabia $24,911; Iran $7,173, Qatar $108,458, and 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) $45,726. The GDP per capita of Nigeria is $1,535 (OPEC 2014). 
This is low, primarily due to corruption and mismanagement of resources. A small percentage of 
the country controls the nation’s economy while the greater majority wallows in poverty. With 
this in mind, in the following section, discussions are centered on how crude oil has become 
ruinous to Nigeria especially to the ND. Focus is given explicitly to how corruption, 
dysfunctional institutions, and weak economic and political policies have played a pivotal role in 
the poor development and insufficient availability of basic social services for Nigerians, despite 
the amount of revenue generated from oil trade. 
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Part one of the discussion explores three factors responsible for Nigeria’s failure to utilize 
its crude oil revenue as an engine for sustainable development. The first is the consideration of 
Nigeria as a rentier state and its inability to maximize the power and opportunities that come 
with the oil industry. This consideration takes into account, the influence of 
colonialism/imperialism. Second, is the examination of how corruption has become endemic in 
the nation’s PI, resulting in stifled development. Thirdly, I analyze the following measures 
towards revamping the Nation’s oil and gas industry, a) Nigeria Extractive Transparency 
Initiative (NEITI), and (b) the proposed Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB).  
Methodology 
This chapter is centered on critical review of a number of websites and relevant 
documents cited, including; International Monetary Fund (IMF), Nigeria National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC), Nigeria Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), Publish What 
You Pay (PWYP), Sahara Reporters, Transparency International, United States Energy 
Information Administration (US EIA.gov) and Environmental Guidelines and Standards of the 
Petroleum Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN).This is supported with structured interviews and 
personal communication with Chevron Nigeria Limited staff, the Department of Petroleum 
Resources staff and CNL’s liaison officers with National Petroleum Investment Management 
Services (NAPIMS). 
Colonialism/Imperialism. What role? 
As per the insights of dependency theory in chapter one, the systemic influence of 
colonialism and imperialism have festered in the affairs of Nigeria. Ojakorotu (2008) states that, 
“colonial legacies lurk at the background of the crises in the Niger Delta: specifically we are 
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alluding to the inability or unwillingness (or both) of the colonial administration authorities to 
address satisfactorily the issues of the Nigerian minorities” (p. 94).  Colonization had a huge 
effect on leadership in African countries. As a matter of fact, Botchway (2011) points out that 
not only were colonial administrations in Africa concerned about having access to Africa’s 
natural resource with no intention of reinvesting the income in Africa, they also survived on 
these rents and didn’t take lightly any opposition to this fact (p.11), a problem that lives on in 
contemporary ‘corruption and inefficiency’. Whereas inefficiency in participating in local 
commerce during the colonial era is not an acceptable excuse, it is indisputable that European 
colonizers did not prepare early African leaders or their successors for the proper handling of 
political, economic, insecurities and other issues of state governance. This type of oppressive and 
inadequate governance is what Nigeria leaders was exposed to prior to independence and the 
type of leadership they understand (Botchway, 2011). 
The nation’s oil is very important to both the state and the IOCs. They both rely on 
maintaining the flow of income and undisrupted access to the crude oil and are willing to sever 
any obstructions. At the same time, they shy away from reinvesting the oil wealth to the 
detriment of the area’s development. The dependence on oil gives both state and corporations’ 
hegemonic power and influence that ultimately fuels unchallenged domination. Pfiffer and 
Salancik (1978, p. 26), proponents of the Resource Dependency theory, believe that for an 
organization to sustain itself, it needs to preserve and guard its partnership with the relevant 
group(s) that grant it adequate assistance and raw material (resources) for its continuous survival. 
In this context, CNL and the Nigerian government create loopholes to ensure that each other’s 
goals can be achieved via the JV agreement.  
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Colonization left unsustainable impacts in colonized states, specifically in their 
environment. One of such in Nigeria is the aspect of disjuncture of the ND people from their 
environment.  CNL‘s alterations of the environment corollary to advancement of their Western 
ideals and principles, and their double standard dynamics that marginalize indigenous 
communities, is still ongoing.  Considering the weak internal democratic composition and 
domination by one political party, the president and his cabal are prone to be autocratic, even in 
addressing the environmental and socioeconomic issues of the ND. Nigeria, being one of the 
periphery (least developed economy) countries, is “vulnerable to capricious executive decisions 
and corruption unchecked by other branches of government” (Wermuth 2003, p. 148). In 
Nigeria’s oil and gas industry, Crawford (2006, p. 402) grants that since government officials, 
politicians and the IOCs are often held liable by the public if they act contrary to promises 
they’ve made to them, they should be held accountable for misuse of state. This does not seem to 
be the case in Nigeria, considering the recent media coverage over missing funds from oil 
revenue. An atmosphere of pervasive hopelessness, seem to be the lot of the majority of the 
population at the lower end of the economic spectrum. 
Despite over fifty years of oil exploration, exportation, trade and contact with developed 
countries, there is not much to show for it. Dependency theory considers how imperialism and 
international expansion by powerful developed countries maintain underdevelopment in less-
powerful countries (Wermut, 2003 p. 47). Elements of this theory classify countries in the World 
System as periphery, core and semi-periphery (Wermut, 2003). In its initial incarnation, Nigeria 
as many former colonized states, was classified as periphery. This classification reflects a 
country’s socio-economic situation, which in turn affects their quality of living standard and 
development. Nigeria is usually classified as a portion of the ‘periphery’. Political instability, 
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poverty and insecurity are the major problems that many formerly colonized states experience. 
Nigeria today exhibits major dependence on one industry, the oil and gas sector, a low standard 
of living for a majority of its citizens, high potential for ethnic and class conflict, lack of basic 
social services such as: clean drinking water, constant electricity, good educational systems, 
adequate health care delivery and security. This is thanks to repressive and corrupt politicians 
and governing agencies (interview data, 2013). 
Corruption: An obstacle towards sustainable development in Nigeria 
Corruption and mismanagement of funds have been noted as the main obstacle towards
10
 
sustainable development in Nigeria (Obi, 2010; Okogbule, 2006, p. 93, Oko, 2002). Accordingly, 
the Supreme Court of Nigeria unequivocally admits that it is a  
Notorious fact, that one of the ills which have plagued and are still plaguing the Nigerian 
nation is corruption in all facets of our national life. It is an incontrovertible fact that the 
present economic morass and or quagmire in which the country finds itself is largely 
attributable to the notorious virus, which is known as corruption (quoted in Amao, 2008, 
p.86) 
 In recent times there have been instances of missing oil revenue funds. The ongoing 
altercation between the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and Nigeria National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) has brought to the national consciousness the endemic nature of corruption. 
Oil revenue is remitted into the Federal Government's accounts via the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN). Various sources reveal that the current feud between these institutions is premised on the 
                                                          
10
 The Central Bank of Nigeria Act of 2007 has the mandate for the entire management and 
administration of the “monetary and financial sector policy” of the Nigeria federal government 
(CBN, 2006 – 2011). 
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Governor of Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) noting that about $20 billion out of $67 billion of 
the nation’s oil revenue from January 2012 to July 2013 was unaccounted for (for more details 
see- This Day Newspaper, June 2014; Business Day, June 2014; Sahara reporters, February). 
Behaviors such as this have shaped Nigeria’s economy and politics, reflecting how a state’s 
economy shapes its governance institutions. Transparency and corruption indices which assess 
the performance of the indexes in oil and gas industries, like the EITI and those produced by 
Transparency International,  incorporate factors like political interference, accountability, 
information disclosure from  companies’, as well as adherence to the legislation or corporate best 
practice into their analyses.  
Efforts towards transparency and accountability in Nigeria’s Petroleum Industry. 
  In a bid to intensify the management, regulation and monitoring of Nigeria’s Petroleum 
Industry and revenue generated, this section discusses measures the Nigeria government employs 
to responsibly manage challenges and address mismanagement of funds associated with the PI. 
These are; the Nigeria Extractive Industry Initiative (NEITI), the Petroleum Industry Bill, and 
Corporate Social Responsibility Bill. According to the Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative (EITI source book 2005), the EITI was announced by former UK Prime Minister Tony 
Blair at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, September 2002. The 
initiative is to encourage IOCs and host oil rich countries to practice a high level of transparency 
and accountability (publish what they pay for oil exploration contracts, and the government 
publish receipts of oil funds) in the contractual and financial exchange they are involved in. This 
is to allow sustainable development and in the long run reduce poverty. 
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Nigeria Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI) 
NEITI is one of the main anti-corruption strategies adopted towards reforming Nigeria’s 
Oil and Gas industry. It is Nigeria’s version of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI), a global undertaking steered towards guaranteeing oil wealth advances sustainable 
development in the nation especially in the oil rich regions (NEITI, 2014). The National 
Stakeholder Working Group within NEITI makes policy guiding NEITI as a contribution toward 
sustainable national economic development (NEITI Strategic Plan 2013-2016). The agency has 
both national and global mandates (Ahmed, 2012). Information gathered from the agency’s 
database shows that on the National level, NEITI is mandated by law to promote transparency, 
due process and accountability in the management of Nigeria’s oil, gas and mining revenues. On, 
while on the Global level, it is mandated on a regular basis to balance and publicly release 
payments and government receipts from transactions between governments and IOCs (Ahmed, 
2012). NEITI was initiated in February 2004, and legalized through the passing of a NEITI bill 
upon approval by both legislative arms of the Nigeria government. The Bill was signed into law 
by former President Olusegun Obasanjo on May 28th, 2007. This made Nigeria the first EITI 
implementing nation with a legal framework for its operations (NEITI, 2014).  
NEITI’s mandate is carried out through reporting of financial audits of Oil Corporations; 
simplifying audit reports for easy viewing and assimilation and widely distributing them for 
public awareness. The agency also proffers solutions on how to address gaps and flaws detected 
in the management and administrative sectors of the PI (Ahmed, 2012). Corrupt practices 
intensified the urgency for improved transparency and accountability and the need to encourage 
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foreign oil corporations and NNPC on behalf of the state, to be socially and economically 
explicit in their contributions to the host nation’s economy.  Even though NEITI expresses its 
efforts at addressing corruption, publishing financial audits of extractive industries and NNPC, 
its involvement in promoting and encouraging governance and transparency in oil revenue 
among oil producing companies needs to be reinforced.  
 In Nigeria for instance, until recently, the revenue accruable to government from oil 
sales and from taxes paid by CNL and other IOCs was shrouded in secrecy. Not only is the 
federal government involved in mismanagement of funds and lack of accountability, but also 
CNL (Banwo, 2013). According to Kolawole Banwo of News Diary Online.com (2013) in 2006 
former President Obasanjo ordered “the recovery of $340 million in short falls from data 
extracted from Tax returns filed with the Federal Inland Service from . . . Chevron Nigeria, 
Mobil, Nigeria Agip Oil Company. . .” Likewise, a tax study carried out by Publish What You 
Pay Norway, showed that Chevron is the most opaque company in the world, with 62% -47 out 
of 77 of its subsidiaries - in ‘secrecy jurisdiction’ (PWYP Norway, 2011. p . 25). Though Nigeria 
is not one of Chevron’s subsidiaries registered in what are called ‘secrecy jurisdictions’11, the 
report underlines that “Chevron’s role as a major actor in sub-Saharan Africa is a cause for 
concern . . .  given its status as the most opaque major EIC” (PWYO Norway, 2011) in the study.  
NEITI data is based on financial and physical audits carried out by Hart Group, United 
Kingdom (U.K), alongside other local Nigerian auditing firms. These audits reconcile details of 
                                                          
11
 Secrecy jurisdictions provide facilities that enable people or entities to escape (and frequently 
undermine) the laws, rules and regulations of other jurisdictions elsewhere, using secrecy as a 
prime tool.  
http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/faq/whatisasj 
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corporate payments and government receipts. These measure the actual flow of oil, gas and 
refined products for accuracy (Ahmed, 2012). Nevertheless, in her presentation to the 
International Monetary Fund Mission in 2012, NEITI Executive Secretary, Zainab Ahmed 
outlines the following findings from audits carried out in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry: 
a) The actual quantity of oil produced in Nigeria is not known 
b) Some sections of Nigeria’s Petroleum Profit Tax (PPT) are not made known. 
c) Interpretation differences exist between NNPC and the Production Sharing 
Contract (PSC) agreement between the state and individual IOCs  
d) A conflict of interest exists in NNPC’s position as both the buyer and seller of the 
nation’s oil, which results in loss and unaccounted funds.  
e) Because the government does not fund its agencies adequately, the agencies lack 
skilled personnel, advanced information technology equipment, and the capacity to operate on 
the same level with the highly sophisticated IOCs. 
f) There is discrepancy when accounting for Signature bonuses receipts – that is, 
payments made by the IOC to the FGN upon initial signing of an oil exploration contract 
(Ahmed 2012, p. 23-24). 
These revealing institutionalized flaws seem to have contributed to the in depth 
challenges faced by the state in its efforts to promote economic growth and development. Based 
on these reasons, it is important that the international body (EITI) supports and enables NEITI 
through global regulations and laws, so it is better equipped in its investigative and monitoring 
prowess. It is assumed that shortfalls such as the aforementioned breed Secrecy Jurisdiction 
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centers that are known to “provide financial environments that allow lower tax regimes, offer 
anonymous bank accounts, keep records and beneficial owners of commercial activities secret 
and criminalize the divulging of information related to financial transaction involving individuals 
and foreign companies” (News Diary Online .com, March, 2013). This makes accountability 
difficult, as secrecy capacitates “commercial trade mis-pricing and tax evasion” (ibid). By 
implication, evidence gathered during my interview session with the liaison officers between 
CNL and NAPIMS revealed that although CNL’s value share (the amount CNL contributes to a 
project and what it gets in revenue sharing) is 40%, and NNPC’s is 60%, in reality, CNL ends up 
having off paper 80% value at the end of a project, that is hidden profits. One of the interviewees 
said “these guys” referring to CNL “are very smart during weighing and loading of the product 
for export” (interview, August, 2013). 
Although there are several positive efforts from NEITI in addressing transparency and 
accountability in the industry, there are also cases of inefficiencies. Prominent among them is the 
huge political interference; inability to divulge IOCs’ “transparency clauses, cost of all 
investments (including those relating to exploration and) . . . the total sum actually paid in 
respect of the taxes” (Banwo, NewsDiary online, March, 2013). It is important to realize that 
revisiting the historical emergence and creation of Nigeria’s leadership regimes is crucial in 
arriving at the best means to revamp the nation’s oil and gas industry. This is because various 
governing bodies, regulatory agencies and institutions commenced in such manner that the 
government has a great influence in their decision making.  For instance Karl (1997) explains 
that when “historical origins of institutions” are ignored, it “reduces the range of decision 
making, rewards some forms of behavior more than others, and shapes the preference of policy 
makers in the future” (p. 9). The decision making process of Nigeria’s governing body seem not 
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to be considerate of the basic needs of the average citizen. To address the challenges and 
shortcomings in revenue management and investment associated with Nigeria’s Petroleum 
Industry, the PIB, a new state regulation, was created. 
Nigeria petroleum Industry Bill 
The idea to overhaul Nigeria’s oil and gas industry through the Petroleum Industry Bill 
(PIB) started towards the end of 2008, after a recommendation from a presidential committee set 
up by late president Umaru Musa Yar’Adua. The restructuring of the country’s major source of 
revenue, the oil and gas industry, - is meant to boost Nigeria’s chances of becoming one of the 
most industrialized economies by 2020 (NEITI, 2014). The Bill intends to increase the chances 
of actualizing this dream by improving on the industry’s capability to be more efficient, 
transparent in all its dealings (revenues, investments) and to demonstrate greater increase 
accountability and corporate governance. The proposed Bill also intends to boost chances for its 
local oil and gas companies to rival the foreign oil companies that currently dominate the 
industry. The Bill has been under intense review since it was sent to the National Assembly for 
consideration (Daily Independent, May 2014). The aim of the PIB Bill as outlined in the 
proposed Act is to increase chances for sustainable development in the country. It is noteworthy 
to point out that however laudable this Bill appears, issues of political interference have to be 
addressed if the envisaged outcome is to be achieved. Are the industry and its officials ready to 
be accountable, transparent and sincere in achieving the set goals of the PIB? What do they 
intend to do differently, and will it have broad acceptance, considering ethnicity and other vested 
interests? There have been several reports of IOCs complaining that if this Bill is passed into 
law, it will cause more harm than good as the firms are especially opposed to tax increases and 
increased control by the Presidency and Minister of Petroleum (OilPrice.com, August 2013). 
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Due to ongoing deliberations on PIB, foreign oil majors are “loath to inject cash; because they do 
not know how much tax they will have to pay” (This Day Newspaper, August, 2013). The 
argument is that it will be a case of Nigeria “shooting itself in the foot” (OilPrice.com, August 
2013), since the Bill will increase oil taxes and rents, deter new investors and frustrate existing 
firms (OilPrice.com, August 2013). Such threats from the oil industry are common in 
jurisdictions that seek to increase royalties, including Venezuela and indeed Canada. This 
challenge is also premised on institutionalized decision making processes that have a strong 
capacity to determine individual or group decisions at all times (Freeman and Hannan, 1977; 
Stouder and Newbert, 2007). In order to propagate the development led projects expected from 
PIB, “the government should acknowledge and take responsibility of its failure in managing the 
country’s wealth and development policies” (Cash 2012, p. 146). The objectives of the Bill 
include: 
a) Creating conducive business environment for petroleum operations; 
b) Protect health, safety and the environment in the course of petroleum operations 
c) Enhancing exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources for the benefit of 
Nigerians; 
d) Creating efficient and effective regulatory agencies; 
e)  Promoting openness and transparency in the industry; and 
f) Encouraging the development of Nigerian content. 
This Bill aims at ensuring the country has an upper hand in the management of its natural 
resources utilizes  revenue generated from those resources for human and capital development, 
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and proceeds in developing other parts of the economy., e.g. agriculture, timber, solid mineral 
etc. The situation of Nigeria’s reputation for corruption is employed by IOCs to critique its 
regulatory function and question the bill. To improve on transparency in Nigeria’s PI, the Bill 
will ensure the industry observes and comply with the NEITI Act 2007.  
PIB, NEITI, and Transparency issues: Is it feasible? 
This section chronicles some public criticisms and concerns regarding the PIB and the 
potential challenges should the Bill be passed. NEITI states that its main areas of concern and 
which it hopes the PIB would improve upon are areas of National development, “protection of 
the operational environment, transparency, accountability and inter-generational equity” (NEITI, 
2014). While agreeing with the intentions of the Bill, Uche Igwe, a visiting scholar at the Africa 
Program at John Hopkins University and a Public Policy Scholar at Woodrow Wilson institution, 
points out that in the NEITI Act (2007), a clause on transparency shows that “Section 14(a) of 
the NEITI Act states that disclosure of audit information will only happen if such information is 
not prejudicial to the proprietary interest and contractual obligations of the audited entity”. With 
this clause in place, it seems the issue of confidentiality and transparency is not completely 
addressed by NEITI, if it gives room for loopholes it is supposed to address.  
Next, some law makers from the Northern part of the country are against the ‘Petroleum 
Host Community Fund’ (PHC Fund), a clause in the Bill that “benefits oil producing areas” 
(Aidaghese, 2014) in the Niger Delta. The Host Community Fund if passed, will decree oil 
companies operating in the Niger Delta must remit an additional 10% funding for the 
development of the ND communities. The Northern region law makers and some analysts are of 
the opinion that the additional 10% funding allocation to the oil producing region is not fair to 
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all. This is because the ND already receives a 13% derivation formula allocation which is not 
being effectively managed and utilized (Diminas 2013; Aidaghese, 2014). The ND indigenes 
argue that the environmental, social and economic damage they endure due to oil exploration 
activities warrants such a clause in their favor. Another area of concern is that the PHC fund bill 
would award more discretionary and decision making power to the President and the Minister of 
Petroleum (Diminas, 2013 p. 3).This they argue will give room for continuous embezzlement of 
oil revenue.  
Another crucial area of concern pointed out by critics of the Bill is omitting “improving 
on metering” (Igwe, 2010). A metering pump is “an instrument for measuring, especially one 
that automatically measures and records the quantity of something, as of gas, water…when it is 
activated” (Dictionary.com). If refer back to the NEITI audit mentioned above, 12 Zainab 
Ahmed, NEITI Executive Secretary pointed out Secretary of NEITI during her presentation to 
the IMF Mission in 2010 that Nigeria does not know the exact quantity of oil it produces. 
Accordingly, in restructuring the oil and gas industry, it would make sense for the PIB to make 
an improved metering system one of its core priorities, so as to address the findings of NEITI 
auditors. In order to propagate the development-led projects expected from the PIB, “the 
government should acknowledge and take responsibility of its failure in managing the country’s 
wealth and development policies” (Cash 2012, p. 146). The underdevelopment of the ND feeds 
into the notion of oil as a resource curse. Resource Curse from the perspective of sub 
optimization of national potentials in the Nigeria context is apparent here. 
                                                          
12
 Igwe U. 2010, points out that the Government of Norway had suggested technical support to 
the Nigerian government on acquiring and installing metering pumps at the nation’s flow 
stations. But IOCs have steadily repudiated this recommendation and good gesture.  
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Conclusion: 
Linking corruption and challenges in effective implementation of CSR in the ND. 
Mismanagement of funds and corruption this chapter demonstrates are contributory factor 
s in the unavailability of appropriate social and economic services for Nigerians. The challenges 
of oil development in Nigeria, however, emerge from politicization centered on revenue 
management, allocation and control and the monitoring of crude oil resources.  These challenges 
have shaped Nigeria’s economy and politics, thereby buttressing the obvious that a state’s 
economy shapes its institutions. This chapter also argues that the JV relationship allows Chevron 
Nigeria Limited (and other IOCs) and the Nigeria government whose responsibility it is to 
provide social services to evade their responsibilities for the ND people. There is a JV agreement 
between these two and they both try to protect each other’s common interest in the partnership 
(Soremekun, 2011, p. 101 in Obi and Rustaad, 2011). CNL extracts oil that provides funds that 
run the state’s affairs and these funds are used in part to oppress those outside of the circle of the 
ruling elite. The government, for its part continues to directly or indirectly defend IOCs through 
its weak environmental policies and militarization of the ND (Soremekun, 2011). This 
partnership has however, not allowed for the creation of an enabling environment for growth and 
development. 
An enabling environment for the institutions, regulatory agencies and IOCs in Nigeria’s 
PI is most crucial for sustainable development in the Niger Delta and in the nation at large (Ite, 
2004; 2007).  The enabling environment, in the context of this chapter, is a “policy environment 
that encourages (or mandates) business activity that minimizes environmental and /or social costs 
and impacts while at the same time maintaining or maximizing economic gains” (Fox et al, 2002, 
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p. 1). During data collection for this study, CNL reiterated that it is not its responsibility to 
provide social services for Nigerians, especially the ND people (Interview data, August, 2013). 
However, they’ve had to assume this position considering the weak role of the state toward 
sustainable development; and to be assured of the ‘social license to operate’ from the 
communities, following a series of disruptions to their facilities by the communities. It is to 
CNL’s attempts to address this problem that we turn in the next chapter. 
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CNL’s Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU): A critique 
Introduction 
This chapter argues that in contrast to the current approach adopted by Chevron Nigeria 
Limited (CNL), an all encompassing and effective approach to (CSR) would link CNLs (CSR) 
and environmental sustainability initiatives, since they work in tandem towards an effective 
developmental agenda of it’s cluster of communities. In examining the effectiveness of  CSR 
practice of Chevron Nigeria Limited, this chapter explores CNL’s implementation of the Global 
Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU), following the firm’s statement that ‘funding is a 
function of Chevron’s operation in a region’ and that sponsorship and donor support activities 
are based on strict thematic focus and identified business goals (business case). That is, if it’s not 
operating in a region it would not typically carry out community type projects (CSR) there. 
Chevron is the third-largest oil producer in Nigeria. It is one of the country’s largest investors 
spending more than $3 billion annually. However it is a fact that what is invested in the region 
does not justify the sometimes irreversible environmental damage caused to flora and fauna.  
Neither are projects transformational, considering the crumbling human and social development 
evident in the region. This chapter adds to the body of literature on developmental expectations 
of the ND; partnership-building; and policy blueprints for environmental restoration and 
economic empowerment.  
To analyze the impact of CSR in the ND, this chapter examines Chevron’s GMoU. 
Outlined in brief earlier in this paper, the GMOU is the firm’s newest CSR initiative. I analyze 
the GMoU as implemented from its Stakeholder Engagement phase through the firm’s 
Environmental, Social and Health Impact Assessment (ESHIA) process. This is to balance 
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attention to social and ecological impacts of oil extraction. The chapter is divided into three 
integrated areas- CSR/ social sustainability; environmental assessment; and the business 
case/license to operate, in analyzing CNL’s corporate strategy on social sustainability and its 
Participatory Partnership for Community Development (PPCD). This is based on the following 
measures: equitable distribution of projects or programs, how it empowers the communities, 
influence in conflict resolution, dissemination and information sharing; creating knowledge and 
awareness, protection of the region’s biodiversity and sustainable resource utilization of 
resources in a sustainable manner. The powerful influence of business interests and inequitable 
power/income distribution on resource exploitation and ‘development’ in the Niger Delta must 
also be recognized.  
The argument in this chapter is based on qualitative research in three phases: 
a) Information on Chevron Nigeria Limited GMoU gathered through qualitative methods, 
including ethnographic observation and a weekly meeting with the department of Policy, 
Governance and Public Affairs unit of Chevron (the department that interfaces between CNL 
and the communities) over a space of two months in 2013; and also with inferences from 
structured interviews conducted within CNL. 
b) Content analysis of empirical documentation of CNL’s GMoU reports and handbook. 
c) A literature review of GMoU in the Niger Delta.  
The field work was carried out in Chevron Nigeria Limited in Lagos – Nigeria, from July – 
September 2013. It focused on the following questions: 
a) What are the dynamics around Chevron Nigeria Limited’s GMoU structure 
b) How is CNL’s GMoU utilized and distributed in the Niger Delta? 
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c) What is the expectation (role) of CNL’s GMoU consultants? 
d) What is the perception of the clustered communities of CNL concerning the GMoU, as their 
perception of this initiative will determine the long-term or short-term sustenance and effect 
of the model.  
Chevron Nigeria’s Stakeholder Engagement Process 
In examining the GMoU, this section will first analyze CNL’s Stakeholder Engagement 
process. Stakeholders often comprise a company’s business partners, investors, employees, 
product suppliers, customers, governments, Non- governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the 
‘communities’. In the context of this chapter, the use of stakeholder refers to the Niger Delta 
communities from whose land/environment crude oil is extracted by Chevron Nigeria. CNL 
defines its stakeholders “as individuals or groups who can affect, or are affected by, or have a 
legitimate interest in the company’s performance” (Chevron Stakeholder Engagement Guide, 
2008, p. 1). Chevron states that the above mentioned agencies and entities also fall in its 
stakeholders group.  
Chevron operates in five states (Delta, Ondo, Bayelsa, Imo, and Rivers) out of the nine 
states of the ND. It refers to the communities in these five states as ‘clusters of communities’. 
The firm has two clusters of communities in Delta state, one in Ondo state, two in Bayelsa state, 
one in Imo state and two in Rivers state (data from weekly meeting at PGPA unit). Stakeholder 
Engagement is a vital part of the CNL’s (ESHIA) process. The diagram below explains the 
engagement process. 
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Chevron Engagement Process 
 
Figure 4: Chevron Nigeria Engagement process           Source: Chevron Nigeria Limited 2008  
The above diagram explains the four stages of CNLs stakeholder engagement planning 
process, which is the firm’s strategizing phase before it actually engages with a community. The 
first process (clock wise) is to prepare. At this stage the company considers and aligns the 
business gains (engagement objectives) with the objectives of the project. Then it considers the 
necessary resources the project would entail. These include ‘money, man power, training and 
expertise’ (Chevron, 2008).  Once these are in place it gets to the second stage where it actually 
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prepares to engage. In this phase, the engagement team analyzes possible challenges such as 
cultural differences, identifies problems and examines possible management plans (Chevron, 
2008). The third stage is to inform the stakeholders of the findings from analyses carried out. The 
result sometimes “could involve altering plans, introducing new proposals, or initiating another 
round of discussion” (Chevron, 2008, p. 8). The fourth and last stage is where the engagement is 
monitored and reviewed to ensure that the business objectives and project engagements set out at 
the first stage are being achieved (Chevron, 2008).  
The department of Policy, Government and Public Affairs (PGPA) 
13
at CNL has the 
responsibility of interfacing with the communities. The department helps to integrate social ills, 
complaints from the communities, and opportunities into the operations, business activities and 
decision making of the firm. PGPA’s responsibilities are:  
(a) Striking an effective corporate-community relationship and creating trust through 
frequent meaningful communications with its cluster of communities (communities in and 
around CNL extractive operations states). 
(b) Supervising foreseen impacts that may arise from the firm’s extractive activities 
(c) Financing costly social projects, programs and partnering with the communities to 
encourage economic and social development in its cluster of communities  
                                                          
13CNL, through its Corporate Public Policy (CPP), reinforce the social impact/effect aspect 
during Environmental Impact Assessments and stakeholder/community engagement design for 
the firm’s major capital projects (MCP). Corporate Public Policy “builds the bridge between 
Chevron, stakeholders and communities”. Stakeholder engagement is an ongoing process from 
the onset of a project right through its completion (Chevron, 2008; 2009). This is because it 
allows the firm to negotiate with all interested parties in order to achieve its goal. This is, to carry 
out a successful and uninterrupted oil exploration and production.  
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(Chevron, Global Operations, n.d).  
Examples of health and social concern that PGPA sometimes find challenging to address 
include: the emission of Hydrogen Sulphide (H2S- a very poisonous flammable gas) during oil 
drilling, which can cause detrimental health damage. Other social concerns may arise for 
example due to water contamination during oil exploration, or high demand for water with the 
influx of people and business activities for the establishment of a project site. With that said the 
firm states that any specified orders from the state are mainly based on a ‘project by project’ 
basis, and that most of Stakeholder Engagement plan or design is recorded in the Scoping phase 
(Chevron, 2009, p. 11).  
CNL’s Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU) and issues of partnership:  
Difficulties in community relations and participatory partnership in CSR community 
related development caused a shift from traditional corporate philanthropy to social investment 
(see Zalik, 2004; Macleod and Lewis, 2004; Ite, 2007; Idemudia, 2008). Zalik, (2004) identifies 
the shifts - from Community Assistance CA (1960-1997) to Community Development CD 
(1998-2003) and then, Sustainable Community Development SCD (2004) all under the banner of 
CSR. These engagements were not successful because there was no CNL-‘community relations’ 
(Onabanjo, 2005, quoted in Alabi and Ntukepo, 2012), the communities did not trust CNL and 
there was no community participatory engagement in previous measures.  Onabanjo, defines 
community relations as a “problem solving process and this involves strategic analysis of the 
problem, planning, taking action, and evaluating program effectiveness, inadequacies, or outright 
failures” (p. 44 quoted in Alabi and Ntukepo, 2012). CNL argues that the GMoU, has produced 
more success stories than its previous corporate- community relationship (Field work data, 
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2013). The following are some examples of socio-economic development initiatives in 
Chevron’s Regional Development Communities (RDC’s) as listed in the company’s GMoU 
handbook. These developments, the company insists, promote and support long term 
development goals: 
a) Social infrastructures -water bore-holes, construction of road networks and 
bridges, housing, cottage hospitals, electrification, transportation, building of town halls 
b) Economic empowerment -provision of micro-credit  
c) Education -awarding scholarships etc.  
d) Health programs – Tuberculosis and Malaria awareness and treatment, HIV and 
AIDs, Roll back Malaria programs 
e) Arts and culture 
f) Organizational sponsorship – traditional rulers support, music etc. 
Since its inception in 2005, CNL continues, its GMoU has generated approximately 200 
projects in more than 400 communities, villages and chiefdoms and benefited some 600,000 
community members (Chevron: Nigeria Fact Sheet, 2014; Chevron Corporate Responsibility 
Report, 2012)in response to increasing violence in the ND though often with limited sustainable 
impacts. This is the crux of the frustration of the ND people. 
The implementation of the GMoU has its strong points (according to) Andrew Fawthrop, 
Chairman and Managing Director of Chevron Nigeria Limited (CNL).  In his message in the 
company’s 2012 Corporate Social Responsibility report, he highlighted key achievements of the 
company in the areas listed above. While to some of the communities these projects/programs 
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appear laudable, to others they remain uncompleted and are a band-aid solution. With these 
achievements in mind, CNL, hopeful that the GMoU represents a positive vision that is 
sustainable, felt the model should be more universal. They sold the idea to other oil companies 
including Shell, (Aaron, 2012; Zalik, 2011; 2012), Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas NLNG (field 
work data, August 2013) and others.  
Using data from Nigeria, some CNL staff from the ND expressed their anger and 
disappointment at the standard of the company’s GMoU projects. According to one staff, “the 
company does not give sizable compensation, no viable infrastructure, and small amounts as  
scholarships funds The latter consist of 50, 000 Naira- Nigeria currency, (approx. USD $300) for 
secondary school students (High school), and 150,000 Naira (approx. USD $900), for University 
students” (Oral interview conducted 29th August, 2013). Therefore, this chapter buttresses one 
of the broader points of this paper, while CNL like most IOCs can play an important role in 
partnering with state government for the development of the ND. 
Objectives of CNL’s GMoU 
Below are some of the objectives for the creation of the GMoU as listed on CNL’s GMoU 
handbook guide: 
a) To build community capacity and ownership through high impact and sustainable 
community development projects that promotes social and economic growth 
b) To jointly promote a safe and secure environment within the community in which 
they can fulfill their development potentials and CNL can fulfill its business goals.  
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c) To cultivate transparency and accountability into the governance of projects and 
programs by encouraging stakeholders to operate within the framework of the GMoU processes. 
d) To promote a harmonious relationship between communities and CNL 
e) To support the Regional Development Committees (RDCs) in their efforts to 
pursue peace and stability through effective conflict resolution processes.  
(CNL GMoU handbook, n. d) 
The GMoU Management Process. 
For a smooth and integrated PPCD management plan CNL entered into agreement with 
eight RDCs, representing CNL’s eight communities near the company’s on-shore and off-shore 
areas of operation. The RDCs, work in alliance with the Project Review Committee (PRC) in 
planning and managing community development projects in their geographical areas, which is 
also rooted in a “sustainable livelihood assessment and project prioritization done at the outset” 
(CNL GMoU handbook, n.d). There is also the Peace review Committee who are on hand to 
ensure the communities maintain peace and harmony throughout the duration of any GMoU. 
This is explained further below. 
Data gathered from field work revealed that CNL must have a business vested interest 
and the financial resources to determine which proposal should receive funds in any RDC. The 
issue of approving projects based on prioritization is a reflection of CNL’s previous community 
assistance model.  In previous community development assistance, CNL funded projects it felt 
the communities would prefer knowing that as providers of funds for CSR projects they also 
have the power to determine which project is funded. Therefore, CNL’s CSR conduct aligns with 
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the notion that “the CSR philosophy is convenient for corporations as the approach shifts focus 
away from regulation” (Amao, 2008, p. 75). It is more cosmetic than effective, especially in the 
absence of proper environmental diligence in its assessment processes, as demonstrate in chapter 
two. 
The stakeholders in this GMoU model are CNL, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), local and state governments and 
the communities. The state government is said to be there as an arbiter and umpire for fair play. 
This is rather curious as most of the development agencies and commissions set up by the FGN 
to address development in the ND have not been successful due to fraud, corruption and 
politicization of projects. Information gathered during field work reveals that budgets for GMoU 
projects for a particular period are generally negotiated and agreed upon by the participating 
communities. The funds are paid into an account of which all stakeholders are signatories. All 
stakeholders are then given Mandate Cards with specimen signatures which confirms they are 
signatory to the account. This (according to CNL) is said to ensure transparency and 
accountability (field work data, August 2013). The question worth asking is ‘does it? 
Additionally, through a clause ‘financial support is dependent on the communities not 
obstructing or blockading projects due to grievances’, means that recipients are constrained from 
using collective action to demand redress for pollution or other concerns. As such, to ensure 
‘uninterrupted operations’, CNL releases ninety percent of the agreed fund at the outset of the 
project; the remaining ten percent is released at the completion of CNL’s operation in the area 
without disruption from the communities (oral interview at CNL, August, 21st, 2013). This 
according to CNL is used to checkmate the communities. 
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Environmental Assessment/sustainability 
One of the measures I set out to analyze in CNL’s GMoU is how it plans to protect the 
biodiversity of its areas of operation. So far, the environment remains on the backburner of the 
model. For example in the firm’s Stakeholder Engagement Guide 2008 it states that in some or 
most cases while stakeholder needs may concern the “environment” or other pressing problems, 
those in charge of the engagement (CNL staff) should recognize that issues raised by community 
stakeholders “may not hold the same importance for the company” (Chevron Stakeholder 
Engagement Guide 2008, p. 4). Although CNL tries to portray a high level of compliance and 
credibility in its operations, its decisions and actions sometimes appears contradictory and self 
serving.  A CNL staff interviewed accepted that “the greatest challenges facing the company, 
IOCs and the Nigerian government is environmental sustainability”. He added that the company 
should “do more fishery studies, and that there are a lot of things CNL can do to manage 
strategic issues such as doing more on cleaning up and restoring legacy sites” (Oral interview, 
August 23, 2013). Since IOCs initiated CSR, it is unsurprising that they intentionally exclude the 
environment as it would cost far more to ensure environmental clean-up and preservation than it 
does to make the relatively small social investment (Darlsrud, 2006, p. 5) included its CSR 
policy.   
Gains for CNL 
As a business venture, CNL’s core business objective laid out for the adoption of the 
GMoU is to gain and retain the ‘social license to operate’. Hence the implementation, funding 
and sponsoring of community style projects is based on identified business goals (business case) 
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and social value to the communities. This it tries to achieve, by strategic and intentional 
corporate social investment notch in strong economic enhancement and self-sustaining 
engagements since employment rate is very low.  For example, when a project is undertaken, 
CNL only supervises the contractors to ensure performance standards for the project. All other 
services that are needed (e.g. welding, fitting, rigging, logistics, provision of diesel, food supply, 
security, security boats, water supply etc.) are locally contracted to the three major ethnic groups 
(Ijaws, Ulaje’s and the Itsekiris) by the Local Community Contractors (LCC) (field work data, 
2013). The LCC is a part of the GMoU committee, and negotiates with third party service 
providers for any of CNL’s project. While on my visit to CNL’s Escravos Tank Farm in Delta 
state in August, 2013, I noticed the Farm’s restaurant was serviced by local caterers from the 
communities around. Also, I met with a couple of community members working at the Escravos 
Tank Farm waste dump yard. These are some of the various income generating and effective 
local projects that provide employment for the communities (Field work data, 2013). Most staffs 
interviewed were of the opinion that since its inception in 2005, the GMoU, has been able to 
diffuse ethnic clashes, through equitable and mandatory awarding of social service provision 
contracts as mentioned above to the three dominant ethnic groups in each community.  
GMoU: foreseen challenges 
Difficulties related to the practical implication and implementation of the GMoU model 
pose a huge threat to its success. This is because of the powerful influence of business interests 
and inequitable power/income distribution related to resource exploitation and “development”. 
For example, CNL’s own documents reveal that while it values this community-corporate 
relation, “Chevron employees should be clear about the company’s interests yet be willing to 
listen without making commitments when stakeholders focus on unanticipated or seemingly 
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extraneous issues” (Chevron Stakeholder Engagement Guide, 2008; p. 4). This cold business 
position appears at variance with how flexible the firm says it is willing to be in its stakeholder 
engagement. 
Lack of information sharing, knowledge and awareness of signed GMoU projects, many 
local news reports have pointed out, are a major problem associated with CNL’s GMoU. 
Dissemination of information allows meaningful dialogue and negotiation. Therefore, for GMoU 
to be perceived as inclusive, it must provide widespread information on its projects in the 
communities, so they are equipped to make meaningful contributions at every stage of projects. 
Every group in a community should be respected and consulted. Most youths accuse the RDCs 
and community heads of not fully disclosing or sharing information about projects with them. 
They also blame the community elders of selling or awarding scholarships slots provided by 
CNL to their family members or friends (Interview conducted August, 29
th
, 2013).  
Information gathered during my field work showed that many ND local chiefs and the 
chairman of the Regional Development Committee (RDC) are very excited and appreciative of 
CNL’s GMoU. They see the model as a promising channel for sustainable development for the 
region, encouraging the ND youths to stop oil pipelines vandalization and oil theft.  On the 
contrary, Jike (2004) succinctly indicates that because oil in the ND now shapes the ‘traditional 
authority’, the ND youths have little or no respect and/or trust for the elders. The elders are seen 
as the “epitome of colossal failure” (p. 696). Oil in the ND has shaped traditional authority 
through formal and informal payments and initial negotiations with communities’ governing 
councils. Not only did Jike fault the influence of oil on ND traditional authority, but also 
Ikelegbe (2005), who maintains that ND community heads, chiefs and decision makers receive 
awards and gifts and as such their integrity have been compromised (p. 215) .With this in mind, 
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the youths do not believe in any GMoU negotiations or agreements the elders or traditional 
authority reach on their behalf, due partly to lack of information sharing and awareness of most 
of these projects.  
Similar to Jike’s point, one of the prominent features during colonial rule was the use of 
traditional authority (chiefs, elders and community heads) as intermediaries. This method was 
employed to aid penetration and conviction of the communities in order for the colonizers to gain 
access to natural resources and other treasures they sought. Meanwhile, up to this present time it 
seems like the same access method is still in use indirectly by CNL through its GMoU RDC 
members. This method, according to, Faleti (2014) and Zalik (2012) appears to be strategically 
and deliberately chosen to allow them to pursue their own objectives and dictates while 
appearing sympathetic to local and environmental needs.  
Recommendation and Conclusion 
I believe that the GMoU has helped in reducing community related destruction as well as 
promoting proactive advocacy with relevant stakeholders in the ND. Although the GMoU 
program can be viewed as a hopeful and positive approach to sustainable development, it is 
important for CNL to reevaluate their operational standards in their host countries and host 
communities (Bhagwati, 2012, p. 5). CNL should understand the implications of being truly 
socially responsible. Linking funding to corporate operations in a region creates uncertainty and 
constraints in monitoring.  
In my view, the GMoU should be designed to look beyond traditional philanthropy and 
lead to inter-organizational collaborations in adding value for sustainable development. This way 
Chevron can collaborate with research companies in areas of environmental restoration, public 
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health, etc. for a sustainable impact. This sort of proposed investment would be for much long 
term than the current community focused model. One suggestion would be that CNL should 
modify its GMoU implementation method by establishing and enforcing long and short term 
development agenda. It should expand its self-sustaining targeted investment at benefitting a 
larger number of people and encouraging transparency and engendering confidence in the 
process. It should review and improve the model towards greater accountability, encouraging 
creativity and research. The government should take responsibility of investing the country’s 
petro dollars in human and capital development, giving grounds for GMoU to be effective and 
successful.  Then it can make CSR a part of the industry law. Finally, environmental restoration 
and regeneration should be made mandatory components of CSR. 
Nigeria's dependence on oil rents to the exclusion of other potential revenue sources, 
breeds corruption in the industry. The fixation on crude oil as the major revenue earner by the 
Nigerian government is not lost on the IOCs, who capitalize on it to circumvent certain aspects 
of the law with tacit approval of the government. This tends to frustrate efforts at the creation 
and implementation of effective measures for tackling the endemic poverty and lack of 
development in the ND. Economic and social commentators have argued that the best way to 
avoid grave economic imbalance and corruption in Nigeria is for the government to invest oil 
resource revenues in agriculture, manufacturing and solid mineral sectors. The GMoU has 
potential for collaboration, quality enhancement, and technology transfer if all stakeholders are 
genuinely engaged and there is fairness and continuity in sustainable projects. There should be a 
conscious move away from corporate image redemption towards corporate substance through 
ethical behavior in private and in public.  
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On a final note, CNL   should work in partnership with government (as they already work 
in a Joint Venture agreement for oil extraction, production, and revenue sharing) to ensure that 
their CSR contribution is reflected in the overall plans for development in the region. Sustainable 
development should be anchored on the tripod of environmental sustainability, sound business 
practices and social responsibility.  
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Conclusion 
This study set out to examine the lack of environmental sustainability measures in CNL’s 
GMoU. The study identified the business objective (business case) of CNL and government’s 
priority (mono economic dependence) on oil in Nigeria. The disjuncture from the environment, 
inadequate reciprocal contribution by the Nigerian government, and the clamor by the 
communities, has culminated in an insecure, polluted and underdeveloped ND today. The study 
has also tried to assess the capacity of Chevron Nigeria’s GMoU to empower its cluster of 
communities, reduce communal and ethnic rivalry and conflicts and address or at a minimum 
create a plan on environmental regeneration.  
  This study tries to elicit the importance of transparency and accountability as factors in 
deconstructing why Nigeria’s Petroleum Industry has stunted the growth of the region where the 
resource is domiciled. It is important to locate the contentious issue of environmental 
degradation in the region, since every party – Chevron Nigeria, other international oil companies, 
oil communities, the regulatory agencies (DPR, FEMev, other monitoring agencies) - and the 
Nigeria government all claim they are meeting the required expectations and standards. The 
study also examines whether the PIB and NEITI can effectively restructure the industry by 
instilling ethical and good business practices. The study also addresses why Nigeria as an OPEC 
member has not utilized the dividends to optimally develop the nation’s economy.  
The ND environmental issue is placed at the backburner of CNL’s CSR model and the 
government’s plan at restructuring the PI. Empirical findings from CNL show that the business 
case is a determinant for investing in a community project. Holding back part of the agreed funds 
is used as a measure to ensure the communities keep to their part of the GMoU agreement. This 
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stick and carrot approach is meant to checkmate or deter any form(s) of ethnic or communal 
disruption of CNL’s operations and facilities. Findings from my field study also revealed that 
CNL tries to always minimize cost during Environmental Assessment procedures, thus ensuring 
that business objectives and gains are expressly protected. 
The framework for governance and how it impacts the PI in Nigeria needs revisiting. 
This will elucidate the dynamics of weak regulations and government policies, corruption, mis-
management of funds and a high rate of inefficiency that have stifled efforts at leveraging the 
Nation’s membership in OPEC. The use of force and coercion, an overarching characteristic of 
colonial rule, is still dominant in the ND today.  The relationship between capitalism, 
colonialism and development plays out through the double standard of IOCs, and militarization 
which the Nigeria government have employed in the past prior to the amnesty measures. The 
State is complicit in creating loopholes for embezzlement of oil revenue, thereby tacitly enabling 
IOCs to manipulate regulatory laws. The government’s hesitance in addressing the absence or 
lack of accurate metering pump system (since the exact amount/quantity of oil the nation 
produces is not known) is an example of perpetuating graft in the industry. The 
underdevelopment of the ND is a culmination of corrupt leadership and opportunistic corporate 
entities. It is not an issue of restructuring the PI; it is an issue of rehabilitating the corrupt minds 
of the nation’s decision makers. It is not a case of detecting the problem but a case of actually 
addressing the root causes of the problem. It is not a case of apportioning blame to the 
communities for economic sabotage; it is a case of understanding their dilemma and creating an 
opportunity for survival. The resource dependency framework allows organizations to continue 
their business activities despite not addressing the resulting environment and social issues 
(Pfiffer and Salanciks, 2003). CSR therefore does not necessarily address the pressing 
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development needs of the ND people as argued by Frynas, (2005) and this study, even though it 
creates temporal satisfaction for a lucky few.  
The effects of the NEITI, the proposed PIB and the CNL;s GMoU, are welcomed and 
seen as major leaps towards more  effective restructuring of Nigeria’s oil and gas industry. 
Nevertheless, findings from several studies, including Faleti (2014), Aaron (2010) and this study 
concur that these restructuring measures are all deliberative, strategic and self-serving. These 
initiatives prescribe issues but do not meaningfully address them. For example, The PIB which is 
under intense scrutiny to restructure the oil and gas sector, does not have plans in place to 
address the metering pump system contained in the NEITI findings. Issues of lack of 
accountability and transparency associated with the Industry must be strategically addressed 
before there can be meaningful sustainable development from oil revenue. This study’s 
justification for these arguments is that the proposed policy review should address properly all 
the pressing issues associated with the nation’s oil and gas sector. For effective CSR, NEITI and 
government policy towards regenerating the ND environment, there is need for further research 
on how the environment could be better located in CSR programs.  
This study has given an evaluative perspective on Chevron Nigeria’s Environmental 
Assessment process and it’s CSR: GMoU model. The study was conducted in CNL’s head office 
in Lagos Nigeria through weekly meetings at the CSR department and environmental studies 
unit.  Data was also gathered through attendance at an EIA Review Workshop between CNL and 
the DPR; a visit to CNL’s Escravos Tank Farm in Delta State, and interviews conducted with 
staff of both organizations.  
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In spite of the development case for CSR as portrayed by CNL’s GMoU, the business 
case seems to be of utmost priority. Although the firm has invested through the GMoU in the 
communities and businesses must maximize their profit margin in any business venture, the case 
of the ND needs rethinking as double standard measure of policy implementation have been seen 
to be at play in most crucial decisions making and actions. CNL’s GMoU and other CSR 
measures seem to not be effective and sustainable in the long run. A verifiable percentage of 
IOCs profit should be devoted to community project development. To help create a balance 
between profit maximization and environmental preservation, CNL should be compelled to abide 
by the environmental ordinances, and the supervisory agencies should be equipped to carry out 
their statutory functions. 
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